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Kennedy was no hypocrite nor did he 
play politics as usual with civil rights. 
(Wofford 175) 
 
Kennedy’s housing order, in short, was 
[…] a necessary move in the complex 
game he was playing on the civil rights 
issue.  
(Matusow 69) 
 
Everyone critical of Mr Kennedy said 
he was playing politics. Certainly this 
was true. That he played politics is one 
of his claims to greatness.  
(Golden 161) 
 
The administration is impressed by the 
fact that the Negro masses are now 
becoming involved in the civil rights 
struggle.  
(Lomax 235) 
 
Kennedy was not much impressed by 
the fact that thousands of black people 
were, for the first time, acting to seize 
their own freedom. 
(Miroff 227) 
 
 Kennedy now responded to the Negro 
revolution by seeking to assume its 
leadership. 
(Schlesinger 966) 
 
Yet the President persisted in his effort 
to obstruct the civil rights movement. 
(O’Reilly 213) 
 
His dream was theirs. 
(Sorensen 505) 
 
Their concerns were not his concerns. 
(Niven 8) 
 
 
We all see different pasts. 
(Wallerstein 1) 
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1 Introduction 
 
When writers and historians represent the past, they rely on a wealth of 
primary as well as secondary reference material available. The outcome of their 
research and judgement depends on what they select out of the ‘cultural tool kit’ 
(Wertsch 324). It is therefore evident that from the way authors select and choose 
their material, conflicting narratives develop, as becomes evident from the 
aforementioned quotations. We can approach the past only by means of texts or 
audiovisual material, hence historical research is an active process of the 
researcher at work, which may lead to contradicting narratives:  
 
The different voices and perspectives involved may be 
woven together in a smooth and coherent way, but in 
many cases their simultaneous presence results in 
struggles, or conflicts, that reflect patterns of power 
and authority in the sociocultural setting (Wertsch 
324). 
 
This thesis aims at unravelling the various perspectives and discourses on 
the Kennedy brothers in connection with the Civil Rights Movement in the time 
span of President Kennedy’s term from 1960 to 1963. On the domestic front, issues 
of race and civil rights have always been topics of controversy, stirring up 
emotions among the people and their political leaders. The United States are 
characterised by a turbulent history of immigration and the mingling of ethnicities. 
A hundred years after President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, 
which represented a major step in the abolishment of slavery, African Americans 
started to claim their legal rights in essential areas of living, such as education, 
housing or employment where discrimination was still predominant. The Civil 
Rights Movement had gradually gained support and strength over the 40s and 50s 
and ultimately reached its peak in the early 60s, expressing the discontent of 
African Americans by means of demonstrations, sit-ins and other non-violent ways 
of direct action in order to raise awareness for their needs. For any politician, it was 
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a demanding task to face the challenge of arbitrating between the opposing parties 
involved in the struggle. Especially the Southern states like Mississippi or Alabama 
proved to be extremely reluctant to introduce change because of their traditional 
politics and even more so because of the mindset of citizens who had lived and 
upheld racial segregation for decades.  
The conflicting portrayal of civil rights related political action of Robert 
and John F. Kennedy will be compared and analysed in detail, whereby the image 
of the Kennedys as American heroes is either being supported or deconstructed by 
the authors. I have had the opportunity to conduct research at the renowned John F. 
Kennedy Library in Boston, Massachusetts, where I was confronted with plenty of 
excellent material ranging from primary sources in the form of correspondence, 
official documents and memoranda to secondary literature. For in-depth analysis, I 
have selected nine of the most substantial accounts which are concerned with the 
topic of racial segregation in the early 60s, some of them dealing with the 
Kennedys and civil rights at length, some only devoting one chapter on this issue in 
a broader account. By comparison, they cover a broad range of opinions about the 
Kennedys’ civil rights achievements ranging from unlimited praise to harsh 
criticism. Moreover, the books were written at different stages in time, which is 
certainly a decisive aspect in the assessment of the impact of politics. In the preface 
to the second edition of his book The Chief Executive, Louis Koenig states that ‘in 
the luxury of hindsight [I have] amended some of my earlier judgements’, referring 
to the almost ‘ridiculous’ time span between 1964 and 1968. This shows that not 
only does our view of things change in the course of time, but also do results of 
policy-making evoke differing reactions depending on what happened after the 
observed events.  
Harry Golden was the first author to cover the subject in depth in late 1964 
in his book Mr Kennedy and the Negroes, reaching a thoroughly positive 
conclusion, as does Carl M. Brauer in John F. Kennedy and the Second 
Reconstruction (1977). Especially the latter bases his judgement on the impact of 
the Kennedy brothers’ communicative power, which shall be discussed in a 
separate chapter.  
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The second group of authors includes former members of the 
administration, among them presidential advisors Theodore C. Sorensen and 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, two of the most significant writers of what is commonly 
referred to as the ‘Camelot school’ in the bulk of literature on President Kennedy. 
Both authors had published their first books on Kennedy only a few years after his 
tragic death, which is why their accounts are characterised by unlimited loyalty, 
resulting in a euphemistic narrative of their memories, which is accentuated with 
dramatic language. With Sorensen having formerly served as the President’s 
counsellor, his book Kennedy (1964) is by far the least critical and appears like an 
extension of his duties as a speech writer: a fervent pro-Kennedy account. In 
hindsight, Sorensen had recognised his unbound idealisation of events, as 
becomes evident in his recently published book Counselor (2008), a somewhat 
more critical account of his time in the White House. Finally, in his theoretical 
discussion of Decision-making in the White House (1963), Sorensen debates the 
mechanisms behind the White House machinery of policy making, providing the 
reader with promising insights of power relations from differing perspectives. The 
latter book shall assist us in placing the civil rights issue in a broader context. In 
his Pulitzer-Prize winning account A Thousand Days (1965), Arthur M. 
Schlesinger makes an effort to adhere to a more neutral way of description. 
Although definitely a Kennedy supporter and in many ways coincident in opinion 
with Sorensen, he refrains at least language-wise from overstatement. Sorensen 
and Schlesinger’s books undoubtedly represent the very essence of the Kennedy 
myth. The analysis of their lines of argument will be followed by a discussion of 
what is commonly called the politics of incrementalism, a central motive in the 
assessment of John F. Kennedy’s political style.  
Two other confidants of the Kennedy brothers have produced 
fundamentally different representations with distinct focal points. Harris 
Wofford’s portrayal Of Kennedys and Kings (1980) is clearly a more balanced 
account in which the author critically reflects his time as Civil Rights advisor to 
the President without making a definitive judgement. While he does not always 
agree with Kennedy’s moves, he generally seeks to create a basis for the reader’s 
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understanding for President Kennedy’s course of action, avoiding a one-sided 
portrayal. Finally, Burke Marshall, former Assistant to the Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy and Head of the Civil Rights Division in the Department of 
Justice, delivers his perspective on the issue from a predominantly legal point of 
view in his book Federalism and Civil Rights (1964), debating the possibilities 
and limitations of the President’s and the Attorney General’s power to intervene 
in critical situations.  
As those were the men pursuing their profession in the eye of the storm of 
civil rights, it is adequate to classify them as experts. It is therefore not surprising 
that the reader usually tends to rely on the judgements and evaluations of subject 
matters related to the author’s area of expertise. Yet in The Uncertainties of 
Knowledge, sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein makes the significant point that 
‘the process of investigation, the procedure through which the observations are 
made, transforms the object of investigation’ (Wallerstein 11). While this 
transformation does provide the author with a unique perspective and a range of 
valuable insider knowledge within his reach of competence, it inevitably leads to 
a biased or even idealised account. This can be easily observed in the early books 
of Sorensen and Schlesinger, who not only aimed at justifying the 
administration’s actions but also at erecting a monument in writing for the late 
President Kennedy. Thus, the question of objectivity is a crucial aspect and should 
be taken into consideration when approaching the accounts of the former circle of 
presidential advisors.  
The critical books on the Kennedys and civil rights, although similar in 
their basic views, display significant differences in style and reasoning. In writing 
The Politics of Injustice (2003), David Niven has by far produced the most critical 
account as concerns both his language and his line of argument. His special focus 
centres on the question of political support from the Democratic Party and the 
South, as well as on the Freedom Riders, one of the major civil rights crises the 
administration had to handle during its term. Professor of Social Policy Mark 
Stern creates a neat black-and-white narrative of the Kennedys versus the Civil 
Rights Movement in his book Calculating Visions (1992). In the most recent and 
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probably most detailed account of the issue, journalist Nick Bryant openly 
speculates and reflects on the actions and motives of the Kennedys throughout his 
book. While acknowledging the arguments of Kennedy supporters, he makes an 
effort to prove his position, which is revealed already in his title The Bystander 
(2006).  
After having discussed the primary lines of argumentation, it will be 
necessary to return to the thoughts of chapter two in order to contrast the two 
basic approaches which emerge in the discourse, whereby the role of morality and 
rationality as tools for approaching historical texts will be discussed. The 
distinction between legal and moral argumentation is an essential parting line and 
will shed light on the origin of the differing lines of argument. 
Civil rights policy is a relatively neglected topic in the literary canon about 
the Kennedy administration. In his book The New Frontier revisited, Mark J. 
White remarks that ‘historians, in fact, have spent less time proportionately on 
Kennedy’s domestic agenda than Kennedy himself devoted to it’ (White 223). In 
the early 60s, John F. Kennedy’s administration had to deal with several arduous 
tasks, among them highly significant foreign policy issues such as the Cuban 
missile crisis, the Bay of Pigs invasion or the Cold War, which clearly dominate 
the literature on Kennedy’s policy.  
A focus on civil rights, however, is of current social relevance, as delicate 
political matters such as race and the way politicians handle issues of this kind are 
of central interest in industrial societies around the world and a constant source of 
public debate. Robert Kennedy once claimed in a ‘Voice of America’ broadcast in 
1961 that ‘in the foreseeable future a Negro can achieve the same position that my 
brother has’ (Niven 153). Almost fifty years later, the Attoney General’s 
prediction has indeed come true: African American Barack Obama who has been 
given the nickname ‘Black Kennedy’ because of his youthful enthusiasm will be 
the first African American President of the United States which undoubtedly stirs 
up the vivid memories of past historical events relating to race and ethnicity. This 
development forces the people of the United States to reflect upon the history of 
racial segregation in their country, an issue which is still a taboo in many ways. 
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Despite the importance of political correctness, race matters tremendously in 
American society, which raises questions whose answers can only be found by 
looking back at the roots of the problem. More importantly, other parts of the 
world will have to face problems of integration beyond national frontiers as well, 
from the crisis-ridden regions of the world and the European Union to Western 
capitalistic societies who fear the intrusion of radical Islamist groups. Around the 
globe, the topic of cultural, ethnical or religious difference is at present the 
greatest issue of public debate, and its significance is constantly growing. The 
analysis of historically relevant events in this area is thus considered fundamental 
and necessary in order to achieve a greater understanding for the issues society 
still faces up to this time.  
Methodologically, I will analyse the different accounts on Kennedy from 
an American Studies perspective. On the one hand, I will offer close readings on 
the primary material and, on the other, I will focus on the socio-political 
dimension of these texts. In particular, I will debate the chosen primary texts in 
connection with Amitai Etzioni’s approaches for the analysis of interaction 
between social entities. One of the most informative works in the historical 
context of civil rights in the early 60s is The Active Society (1968), which deals 
with questions of political strategy, decision-making and, most importantly, the 
implementation of social change and the role of society’s leaders in evoking that 
change. As the active self in Etzioni’s approach is not conceived as an individual, 
but as several people in a social grouping (cf. Etzioni, Active 5), it is essential to 
see John F. Kennedy as part of the administration and further government 
agencies, which is why the accounts of Burke Marshall and Harris Wofford are of 
vital importance.  
A statesman has to earn his prestige by guiding a nation through the 
challenging issues of his time. The aforementioned quotations show that the 
assessment of the Kennedys’ approach to civil rights in various historical narratives 
differs greatly. It is the aim of this thesis to compare the various lines of arguments 
and, moreover, to apply a cultural studies approach in order to explain the origin of 
the judgements which are represented in historical writing.  
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2 Defining the Civil Rights Theme within the Kennedy Discourse 
 
Before concentrating on the historical representation of the time between 
1960 and 1963 in selected books, it is necessary to shed light on the socio-cultural 
background of the African American struggle for civil rights. As the fight for 
racial equality had been a part of the United States centuries before Kennedy’s 
term, it is essential to analyse why it ultimately emerged so forcefully in the early 
60s. The oldest African American civil rights organisation NAACP (National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People) was founded as early as 
1909, followed by CORE (Congress of Racial Equality) in the early 40s. Yet 
despite significant successes such as the ‘Brown vs. Board of Education’ case in 
1954, which abolished the so-called ‘separate but equal’ doctrine and ruled 
segregation in schools unconstitutional, the direct action approach of the Civil 
Rights Movement was not yet fully developed in the 50s (cf. Brauer 1 – 3).  
There are various reasons why the Movement did not gain momentum 
until President Kennedy’s term. Segregation had a shameful and long-standing 
tradition in the South and was deeply embedded in the collective mind; it had a 
political power of its own and divided both Republicans and Democrats along a 
North-South racial ideology. Kennedy’s predecessor Dwight D. Eisenhower was 
able to avoid the issue except for the incident at Little Rock, Arkansas, where the 
‘Brown’ ruling was fiercely opposed and led to violent riots. Although similar to 
what Kennedy would later experience, earlier events did not lead to lasting 
changes in racial policies and merely ‘foreshadowed the social ferment of the 
1960s’ (Brauer 6).  
Most significantly, African Americans could no longer be ignored because 
they constituted an influential group at last, not only because of the growing 
percentage of African Americans among United States citizens, but also because 
of the growing number of civil rights organisations. Influential groupings such as 
the SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) or Martin Luther King’s 
SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference) did not emerge until the late 
50s and early 60s (cf. Lowery). Direct action strategies such as Sit-Ins and non-
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violent demonstrations found numerous supporters who succeeded in drawing the 
new media’s attention to their cause. These tools served the African American 
community to exert pressure on the government and to claim their rights as United 
States citizens, whereby Kennedy’s 1960 campaign had certainly raised their 
hopes in a nation which would finally be ready for large-scale changes in race 
relations. His rhetorical abilities and the image of the New Frontier made it 
possible for the President to maintain his reputation as a civil rights advocate 
among the African American community for the first two years of his term. In 
1963, however, he was forced to take a firm stand on the issue. 
In order to comprehend the significance of the selected books, it is 
necessary to discuss the nature of the discourse on civil rights in separating it from 
the canon of literature on John F. Kennedy. The literary material about the 35th 
President of the United States ranges from books specialising in the representation 
of the Hollywood-like Kennedy myth to analyses of specific topical aspects of his 
Presidency to historical writings, the latter of which shall be discussed in this 
thesis. Considering the bulk of literature available, the material about Kennedy’s 
civil rights agenda is comparably scarce. It has to be emphasised that the authors 
which have analysed the development of civil rights for African Americans under 
Kennedy do not fit in the dominant discourse, which has two basic tendencies. 
First, there exists a dominant category concerned with foreign policy issues such 
as the Cold War or the Cuban Missile Crisis, incidents which undoubtedly marked 
key events of his Presidency. Secondly, a significant part of literary material 
commonly has a strong focus on the Kennedy myth as such, merely debating the 
rumours which entwine around him and his family. Apart from the mesmerising 
effect his sudden death in 1963 had on the development and enhancement of his 
public image, Kennedy himself was extremely conscious of the influence of the 
new media with its powerful capacity to create lasting impressions in the public 
sphere. He knew how to operate the media machinery to his advantage, a 
successful strategy which is reflected in newspapers, photographs, movies and 
books to this very day.  
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The authors concerned with the area of civil rights predominantly refrain 
from a myth reinforcing discourse. Their accounts are characterised by substantial 
research and by an effort to concentrate on scholarly historical analysis. In the 
course of this thesis, I will show that the problem emerging from this specific 
discourse is not one of historical writing falling victim to the Kennedy myth but 
rather one of reason versus passion whose complex interrelation will provide the 
framework of this thesis and will be discussed in chapters two and nine. The fact 
that we are confronted with historical narratives requires a deeper preoccupation 
with historical writing as such. From a traditional viewpoint, the task of the 
historian is to render the facts in a way which will lead to an accurate reflection of 
historical reality. While this ideal still is a basic guideline, the attitude towards the 
category of historical writing has changed in that ‘it is now necessary to consider 
the claim that historians […] are as much in the business of fiction as novelists 
and poets, in other words that they too are producers of ‘literary artifacts’’ (Burke 
126).  
In her article ‘The Truth of Historical Narratives’, Behan McCullagh 
points out that although fiction and historical writing share certain characteristics, 
the nature of the latter is fundamentally different in that it follows a specific 
organising principle which aims at representing history in a fair way, whereas 
fiction has no element of a duty to truth. While the basic maxim for the historian 
must be a certain amount of this willingness to render a true, fact-based story, 
McCullagh observes that there exist influences which may lead to a distortion of 
the narrative. Therefore, the subsequent analysis in this case has nothing to do 
with assessing the truth of facts in the historical narratives, but with the aspects 
which lead to distortion and conflicting narratives in that the reader’s conclusions 
will significantly differ from reading various accounts. The key to successful 
historical writing, McCullagh argues, lies in a fair representation of the observed 
entity. It becomes clear by comparing the scope an author grants to various issues 
that fairness is an elastic term. The appointment of segregationist judges in several 
Southern states by President Kennedy himself is one of many sensitive subjects. 
While journalist Nick Bryant critically discusses the issue on three full pages, 
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former Kennedy advisor Arthur M. Schlesinger in an attempt to avoid distorting 
the image of the President as a heroic figure mentions this matter in only one 
sentence and mildly terms the incident ‘unfortunate’. A significant part of the 
previously mentioned distortions are the subtle nuances the authors apply in their 
use of language which serve to create a specific image in the reader’s mind. As 
regards eloquence, Theodore C. Sorensen in living up to his former position as 
President Kennedy’s speech writer exploits his rhetorical capacities to the extreme 
by preserving the myth of Kennedy as the youthful leader the American public 
has kept in the collective mind. By contrast, in the line of traditional historical 
writing, other authors like Harris Wofford have decidedly worded their 
commitment to render a fair judgement in the true sense of the word, which, 
despite its vagueness, at least demonstrates the will to create a more balanced 
account.  
The historian’s conception of his duty as an author does not only concern 
his use of language and style or his pledge to render accurate facts. Most 
commonly, there is a more specific objective behind the mere creation of a 
historical account. Professor of political science Peter H. Smith remarks on the 
categories of the historical narrative: 
 
What constitutes political history is, partly, a matter of 
definition. It can be defined as the study of 
government; as the narration of laws and regulation 
passed by those in power. […] It can unravel ideas and 
conceptions about justice, order, and the role of the 
state (McCullagh 36).  
 
It is exactly this parting line which constitutes the basic difference in the 
accounts on the Kennedys and civil rights. Burke Marshall is undoubtedly the 
staunchest advocate of the legal aspect of historical writing. For him, the 
mechanisms of the administration and the often conflicting politics in Southern 
states constitute the very essence of adequate and fair judgement. Others like 
David Niven and Mark Stern have expressed a fundamentally different view by 
focusing on the moral dimension. Their books are characterised by massive 
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criticism of what they conceive as an unjust and overly political approach to the 
issue of African American civil rights. Governmental concerns acquire a position 
of lower priority while the rightfulness of the Movement is constantly 
emphasised. At first sight, this approach appears to be most human and fair, yet at 
second glance it seems to merely reflect the political correctness of the modern 
age without adequately considering the status quo at the time the crucial events 
took place. McCullagh remarks that any author’s access to historical writing 
cannot be correct ‘without also describing as accurately as possible what they 
[past events] meant to the people at the time’ (McCullah 37). Especially in race 
relations, former attitudes which were present throughout the South are not to be 
neglected for all the inherent clarity of the moral question many authors seem to 
take for granted: 
 
The first reason for doubting the possibility of 
providing a fair representation of the subject is the 
conviction that the historian’s personal point of view, 
that is the historian’s preconceived beliefs and values, 
play a very important part in the construction of 
historical narratives, so that the narratives are more 
likely to illustrate the historian’s preconceptions than 
to represent the historical subject accurately 
(McCullagh 41). 
 
This assumption proves to be especially accurate as regards the basic 
theory Stern derives from his analysis. The author portrays the civil rights struggle 
in a black and white manner with strict boundaries. He categorises President 
Kennedy and apparently everyone else in the political sphere as ‘schemers’ while 
the activists of the Movement represent ‘idealists’. The good/bad division can 
hardly be stated more forcefully and is undoubtedly interrelated to the author’s 
personal views which he seeks to demonstrate. It is therefore essential to keep in 
mind the distortions within the historical narrative which derive from differing 
conceptions of the historian’s task.  
While the scope of this thesis only allows for the analysis of a limited time 
span, it has to be borne in mind that the discussed events are the result of a long 
 12
tradition of successive historical episodes. Consequently, authors have chosen 
different key aspects according to what they considered significant knowledge for 
the interpretation of events. Harry Golden is one of the few writers who analyses 
the Movement’s history in depth, while Carl M. Brauer and Nick Bryant have 
dedicated a large part of their books to the discussion of the development of John 
F. Kennedy’s political career before he became President of the United States. 
David Niven, by contrast, has chosen the development of the Democratic Party as 
his foundation for analysis. As the authors have differing conceptions on what the 
fair judgement on Kennedy and civil rights comprises, the books which will be 
discussed in detail do distort the result of the historical discussion.  
 
 
 
3 Reason and Passion 
 
Most of the problems (…) that we now face are 
technical problems, are administrative problems. They 
are very sophisticated judgements which do not lend 
themselves to the great sort of ‘passionate movements’.  
 -  President John F. Kennedy -   
(Niven 178) 
 
 
Two key aspects exist in the discussions about Kennedy and civil rights 
which are fundamentally different in nature. While one group of authors follows a 
political, predominantly legislative line of argument, other writers focus on the 
moral dimension of the conflict. In order to comprehend why this basic parting 
line exists, it is essential to clarify the dynamics of the observed division. The 
force of morality in the area of civil rights had reached its boiling point in the 
early 60s. Meanwhile, the big civil rights organisations were far from being purely 
political. Suddenly, its leaders increasingly began to talk of community and love, 
mostly inspired by their religious background (cf. Miroff 232). The church was a 
significant meeting place for the African American community, and its rhetoric 
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was effectively used for the Movement’s cause. Martin Luther King became one 
of the most famous advocators of peaceful change and one of the staunchest 
supporters of the Movement’s key strategy of non-violent direct action. By 
contrast, the political sphere was perceived by many as a tool to inflict change by 
law and principles but not with emotions as the driving force.  
This moral dilemma, which was dominant in the discourse of this time, is 
reflected in historical writing, as will be shown in the discussion of selected 
books. While historians basically attempted to mirror the unbalanced mood 
throughout the nation, the emotional aspect of the issue tempted many authors to 
render a judgement and a personal opinion about effective political action. 
Obviously, the fundamental legitimacy of the Movement’s ideology of equal 
rights for every citizen of the United States is not debatable and should without 
doubt be included in a historical account. The point is that many writers in trying 
to assess the personal convictions and moral scope behind Kennedy’s actions 
assume the right to twist the facts in a way which proves to be immensely 
misleading to the reader.  
In order to make sense of the conflicting viewpoints in historical writing, 
the status and the role of morality have to be clarified in two respects: first, it will 
be discussed to what degree the politician has a moral obligation to fulfil in order 
to educate the citizens of the nation, as this question is fundamental in assessing 
the validity of arguments. In his book The Golden New Rule (1997), Amitai 
Etzioni is concerned with ‘Communtiy and Morality in a Democratic Society’, as 
the subtitle states. The debate of those fundamental issues will provide us with a 
foundation which will make it possible to develop an adequate analysis of the 
authors’ judgements on the basis of a sociological background. We are essentially 
dealing with a two-dimensional concept, namely morality in the political process 
as such, and moral judgement in historical writing.  
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3.1 Social Change and Morality 
 
In his analysis of the mechanisms of democratic societies, Amitai Etzioni 
links the contrasting juxtaposition of the moral and the pragmatic dimension with 
the capacity of society to change of its own accord. His basic argument 
demonstrates that effective persuasion does not originate from a high level such as 
government, but rather from the basis of society: ‘whole societies […] do engage 
in moral dialogues that lead to changes in the widely shared values’ (Etzioni, Rule 
106). Those dialogues are referred to as ‘national megalogues’ (Etzioni, Rule 106) 
and are believed to be more sensible than top-down leadership. Especially with 
regard to the Civil Rights Movement, this argument seems to be an accurate 
observation, as it is a fact that the Movement was an active societal unit in every 
respect: ‘privileges […] could be won, and often were won, without the 
intervention of Washington at all […] the objectives were immediate and 
concrete’ (Sundquist 258). While progress was being made constantly, it proved 
to be immensely slow and was characterised by numerous setbacks in that the 
Movement sometimes failed to mobilise enough support from the African 
American community, a factor in the documentation of events that has scarcely 
been mentioned, presumably due to the strong focus on political procedures in the 
higher spheres of the nation. Apparently for authors like Niven and Stern, the 
fundamental legitimacy of the Movement’s cause was considered the most crucial 
aspect in analysing the obstacles of its course. Similarly, sociologist Alan Wolfe 
has argued that ‘there is a need in modern liberal societies, no matter how 
committed they may be to either the market or the state (or both) to develop a 
third way of thinking about moral obligation’ (Etzioni, Rule 141). He mentions a 
common feature in historical and contemporary discourse: the cry for moral 
leadership and credibility which has almost become routine criticism directed 
toward political leaders. This regrettable tendency is explicitly addressed by 
Wofford in the preface to his book. Carl Brauer is one of the few authors who 
have hinted at an issue which critics seem to avoid: the effect of the internal 
division of the Movement which did already begin to emerge in the early 60s. It 
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was not until after Kennedy’s death that these struggles became visible for the 
observer in the form of radical Black Power organisations and public figures like 
Malcolm X. It is therefore essential to raise awareness for the fact that the 
Movement itself produced at least some of the obstacles which they were 
confronted with and that there were failures on both sides, an argument which is 
commonly rejected by authors who mostly draw upon the political and moral 
duties of the President.  
Amitai Etzioni is convinced that society itself is the key aspect in the 
creation of its stability. He criticises that the citizens’ impact is generally 
underestimated while there tends to be a focus on public politics and institutions 
for guidance. It is one of the inherent structural characteristics of democratic 
societies that throughout history, they have predominantly relied on legal forces 
much more than on the moral dimension (cf. Etzioni, Rule 139). This has always 
been the case, yet Etzioni claims that a moral approach could ultimately be more 
effective in conflict resolution: ‘The best way to change the direction of a society 
is to have a megalogue’ (Etzioni, Rule 140). While he does not deny the vital role 
of law and public policy, he decidedly argues that they are ‘not the main factor’ 
(Etzioni, Rule 140). He observes that analysts tend to focus on the nation in its 
conception as an institutional formation while they neglect the active potential of 
society:  
 
Most suggestions that are made concern a change in 
public policies or law. The notion that parents, 
neighbourhoods, voluntary associations, and other 
elements of the community can introduce many of the 
needed remedies on their own is often overlooked, or it 
is suggested that to achieve such mobilization requires 
a new public policy or law (Etzioni, Rule 142). 
 
While such an approach is essentially laudable, it is often neglected that 
the groupings Etzioni perceives as the stimulus behind of social change lack the 
necessary resources to become widely accepted. This is the reason why the Civil 
Rights Movement was constantly seeking the administration’s support; they could 
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not effect substantial change on their own. The respective manoeuvring room of 
the Kennedy brothers and the Movement differed to a great extent:  
 
The Government, with its resources and facilities, 
stockpiled more information on Negroes in America 
than Negro organisations ever had been able to gather, 
and the Department of Justice […] attacked on more 
fronts than could Negro civil-rights operations (Booker 
24). 
 
The strategy of voluntary compliance was pursued both by Robert and 
John Kennedy who sought to create the basis for society to implement change by 
itself, yet the significant aspect is that they were aware of the need for a first 
impulse on part of the administration in order to empower the Movement. The 
citizens were in need of organisational tools which they could not operate by 
themselves due to a lack in monetary and human resources. The collection of 
information and reports on the racial situation across the nation was essential, if 
only to produce a greater awareness of how shocking the state of the African 
American community was. Critical authors like David Niven have argued that had 
Kennedy showed the same encouragement in the form of directly addressing the 
citizens of the United States both North and South, he could have exerted more 
far-reaching influence. However, in the case of civil rights the matter seems more 
complex than the arguments for a purely moral approach suggest. The scenario is 
easy to imagine: had Kennedy spoken out more forcefully, riots in the South 
would presumably have escalated. While there is, of course, no way to predict 
what would have happened, this outcome was certainly to be anticipated and 
realistic. Law enforcement in the form of sending troops into the states would 
have been the logical consequence, accompanied by a massive disruption in the 
social fabric throughout the nation which would by no means have been prepared 
for this crisis, and, needless to say, the South would have been even more 
alienated and appalled than it already had been before. Therefore, the historians’ 
argument of Kennedy’s duty to issue polarizing moral statements does not 
adequately consider the ‘what ifs’ of the situation, as opinions across the nation 
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were definitely deeply divided on this issue. Etzioni claims that in order to 
function appropriately, the nation is dependent on its citizens who will not only 
implement social change but also act according to their moral mindset, yet the 
question arises where this moral consensus derives from. Etzioni only vaguely 
explains its source, pointing out that 
 
While fireside chats and other speeches from what is 
called the bully pulpit of the presidency play much less 
of this role than is often attributed to them, especially 
when one expects that a president could change the 
direction of a country with a well-honed speech, they 
do serve to trigger, focus, and nourish nationwide 
dialogues (Etzioni, Rule 107). 
 
Apparently the subsequent dialogue leads to a climate of enhanced 
willingness to compromise on both sides. Nevertheless, the statement indicates 
that a large part of responsibility rests with the community to implement their 
goals with the support of those who guide the nation. Furthermore, it is essential 
to take into account that the masses or other influential public figures might 
choose to ignore the institutional voice of their leader, as had been the case 
numerous times throughout the civil rights struggle.  
However, Etzioni fails to provide specific proposals for conflict resolution. 
Moreover, the morality he speaks of can hardly be defined and thus appears to be 
a vague sketch of an ideal conception. In contrast to individualistic theories, 
Etzioni conceives people of a community as embedded in the social structure with 
the ability to create the atmosphere for favourable changes themselves by use of 
own initiatives. Kennedy attached great value to politics as a tool to give direction 
to the many conflicting demands which occur in a society. Indeed, what 
constitutes a social structure other than its institutions and laws which have 
developed over millenniums of civilisation? Precisely those institutions have built 
communities in the first place; hence Etzioni does not adequately assign those 
aspects the significance they deserve in social life and as a tool for social change. 
Furthermore, the citizens of a democratic society rely on the legal tools and the 
pragmatic weighing of options by the nation’s official leaders: ‘There is 
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considerable evidence that public opinion outside the South now strongly 
supported black civil rights, although the public opposed demonstrations’ (Stern 
86). This statement supports the belief that US citizens entrusted the government 
and the President with the ability to handle the civil rights issue, while they were 
considerably more sceptic of the Movement’s direct action strategy, despite the 
fact that they showed sympathy for its plight.  
Brauer notes that ‘the spirit Kennedy conveyed may well have made 
possible the eruption of social protest to which he in turn responded’ (Brauer 
318), implying that the office of the Presidency was not only the guiding force but 
in many ways the crucial aspect which led citizens to implement change. James 
Meredith, for example, stated that Kennedy’s 1960 campaign was the decisive 
aspect for him to try to enter the University of Mississippi. This means that in 
democratic societies, in many cases the rhythm of initiation is thus that after a 
signal from political, legal and even moral authorities in the higher spheres, sub-
societies will eventually react. Etzioni is right in his assumption that the 
implementation of action and its respective success fundamentally relies on the 
citizens. It is them who effect the change in society, yet the willingness to do so 
mostly depends on the nation’s leaders who serve as an activator. The highest 
political decision-maker therefore is a person who bears significantly more 
responsibility than sub-societies: ‘Being an elected politician demands more of a 
person than being an activist’ (Cavanagh 127). 
Etzioni’s conception of a society guided by national megalogues does have 
its weak points. The moral approach clearly casts doubts on the efficiency of a 
legally guided democracy which has proved to be a very successful model. 
Ultimately, his reasoning constitutes a chicken or egg dilemma, in that the 
question is whether sub-societies and citizens or legal and political institutions are 
the first to initiate change. Does the law trigger social change or does it lag 
behind? Etzioni’s ideal is that  
 
the law in a good society is first and foremost the 
continuation of morality by other means […] unbacked 
laws tend to harm the community more than serve it, 
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and tend either not to be enforced or else set aside 
(Etzioni, Rule 143 – 144). 
 
Legal implementation is therefore considered useless if the moral support 
is lacking. While the two aspects are often in a state of asynchronous 
development, the preferred sequence of events provides that ‘the law mops up 
after moral changes have carried out the main sweep’ (Etzioni, Rule 148). 
According to this view, Kennedy would have been right to grant the nation time to 
gradually build up the moral foundation previous to the introduction of legislation. 
On a public level, however, the President constantly emphasised the legal rights of 
the government and therefore adhered to the doctrine of pragmatic conflict 
resolution. Hence, the civil rights struggle shows that the moral and the pragmatic 
dimension are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In the following chapters, the 
primary texts and the authors’ approach to historical events will be analysed in 
detail. 
 
 
 
4 Constructing Kennedy 
 
American Jewish writer Harry Golden and historian Carl M. Brauer have 
produced two accounts which represent the efforts of the Kennedy brothers as the 
driving force behind the Second Reconstruction. Both authors portray them as the 
centre of effective civil rights action, depicting the machinery of the Department 
of Justice and the White House as complementary institutions which took on the 
task of fighting against segregation with devotion and in a realistic manner. In 
contrast to the common criticism of the Kennedys’ passiveness which will be 
discussed later in this thesis, Golden and Brauer attempt to emphasize the 
successes of the administration. As regards their style, their line of argument 
certainly appears to be more straightforward and therefore also more convincing 
than Sorensen’s or Schlesinger’s euphemistic writing. While both authors readily 
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give credit to the Kennedy brothers for the sole fact that they were willing to act, 
they attempt to investigate the more complex nature of the racial problem with 
Golden, focusing on the historical roots of the Civil Rights Movement, and 
Brauer, exploring the effects of the circle of segregation within Southern states. 
The inclusion of this background information certainly helps the reader to 
comprehend the events of the early 60s within a broader context. Notably, they 
portray the Kennedys as in charge of the situation, a claim which would only raise 
a wry smile among critics. Furthermore, their analysis comprises firm praise for 
other controversial issues, such as the Kennedys’ strategy of voluntary 
compliance and their consistent initiation of symbolic gestures, topics which led 
to significantly differing assessment throughout literature. The obstacles and 
problems the President had to deal with are mainly attributed to external aspects 
outside his area of responsibility. While defensive of the administration’s position, 
Golden and Brauer make an effort to state their point of view in a language which 
proves to be easily comprehensible and plausible to the reader, a stylistic feature 
not always as dominant in other seemingly biased accounts, such as Sorensen’s or 
Niven’s.  
 
 
 
4.1 Harry Golden’s Mr Kennedy and the Negroes (1964) 
 
Harry Golden’s Mr Kennedy and the Negroes was published shortly after 
President Kennedy’s death, yet the book was written as early as 1962 around the 
time the March on Washington took place (cf. Golden 6). It was the first book to 
comprehensively explore the President’s civil rights achievements in detail. 
Golden’s depiction of Kennedy’s civil rights actions is full of sympathy for the 
President and mindful of the obstacles and considerations he apparently had to 
deal with. Nevertheless, Golden has the advantage that in this instance the tragic 
murder of Kennedy in the fall of 1963 cannot be cited as the decisive factor for 
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the idealisation of his presidential abilities, as is apparently the case with 
Sorensen’s Kennedy and Schlesinger’s A Thousand Days. In analysing literature 
on civil rights in the early 60s, it has to be taken into account that the murders of 
John F. Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King most likely had an 
effect on subsequent coverage of the issue, even on books which were produced 
well after the immediate tragedy (cf. Ashmore 363). While Golden sheds little 
light on Kennedy’s civil rights record during his time as a Senator of 
Massachusetts, a subject that is thoroughly analysed by Brauer and Bryant, he 
focuses on the history of African Americans instead. In order to provide the reader 
with an understanding of the Civil Rights Movement’s roots, he discusses its 
background and concludes that its force in the 60s developed out of the fact that 
the situation for African Americans at that time had substantially improved due to 
increasing educational work on part of the Movement’s primary organisations (cf. 
Golden 80). Coupled with the atmosphere of departure in the early 60s and the 
youthful enthusiasm of the new President, African Americans felt that Civil 
Rights organisations had finally gained enough political significance to bring up 
their concerns. The author also sets out to explain the nature of segregation and 
the mechanisms behind its maintenance in Southern states, so that the reader is 
able to comprehend the mood which prevailed throughout the nation at that time 
in an authentic way.  
Golden appreciates Kennedy’s pragmatic approach and his logical way of 
searching for solutions without offending either of the involved groups too much. 
Considering the predicament President Kennedy was faced with, he claims that a 
purely morally guided approach would not have been the appropriate way to act 
as the problem was primarily of a legal nature. In this case, especially with an 
issue that causes passionate arguments, Golden claims that had the President 
insisted on the rightfulness of racial equality and processed with force, 
segregationists could have started a massive upheaval which by all means was to 
be anticipated, judging from the violent mobs that regularly attacked African 
American demonstrators and civil rights workers in the Southern states. The 
author points out that Kennedy had to think in many dimensions of foreign and 
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domestic policy and how its interconnections were entangled with each other. To 
Golden, gradualism represents the appropriate strategy to fight segregation, as he 
is aware that the situation would not have been abruptly better just because 
Congress would have approved of legislation, as there is no instant solution to a 
problem which has built up and lasted over centennials. Moderation did ultimately 
serve to save the nation from a racial war:  
 
It has been said that John F. Kennedy tried to find an 
answer, not to force a solution. His aim was to find the 
ways and means of granting every American the same 
fundamental and basic rights without producing a 
national convulsion (Golden 156). 
 
Golden views the actions of the administration and the Justice Department 
as effective measures to fight the battle against discrimination. He states that the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 had provided the Attorney General with the 
‘responsibility […] to bring legal action’ (Golden 143) in cases of discrimination 
concerning the right to vote and that it was therefore the logical path to follow 
from a legal point of view. The author clearly sets out what steps the 
administration had taken to fight segregation, such as the number of cases in court 
on various issues and the preparation of comprehensive studies, particularly in the 
area of employment. Notably, he does not imply that those measures were 
introduced because the Kennedys were forced to do so, an argument frequently 
cited by critical writers. Furthermore, Golden gives credit to the strategy of 
private persuasion and voluntary compliance, as the President wanted the people 
of the United States to create the climate for change themselves (cf. Golden 163 – 
166): ‘The Presidency was not enough, the courts were not enough’ (Golden 166).  
It has to be emphasized that while Kennedy followed a course of action 
that was not acceptable for some, he was willing to discuss the matter and to 
explain his reasons for the decisions he made, as is evidenced in documentations 
of meetings with Movement Leaders, business men, lawyers and other key 
members of society who had the potential to evoke change. There is ample 
evidence to be found on the success of the White House meetings, with a vast 
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number of letters from attorneys and other officials responding with proposals and 
advice on further judicious proceedings (cf. Archival Source #1). After a meeting 
with lawyers in June 1963, Robert Kennedy sent letters to the participants 
thanking them and stating the main points of the meeting. He specifically 
mentioned what they could do themselves to help advance racial equality, 
encouraging them to take action, to use their professional contacts and, most 
importantly, to stay in touch and report on the problems and difficulties they 
experienced (cf. Archival Source #2). 
Golden carefully examines the way in which public opinion was 
influenced in the assessment of civil rights progress, whereby he notes that a step 
by step processing may not seem as powerful in public perception as a more 
‘direct’ approach which bears more risks. African Americans were desperate to 
see immediate progress being made without further delays, which they 
experienced as the excuses they had heard from the political sphere for hundreds 
of years. In sharp contrast to Niven, an advocate of the moral line of argument, 
Golden argues that being a moderate in such a delicate case was in many ways 
better than provoking a racial war (cf. Golden 154):  
 
Not every Negro was aware of the way the President, 
the Attorney General and Burke Marshall were 
proceeding, for not every Negro voted nor was every 
colored school child free from segregation. But it is 
safe to say every segregationist knew (Golden 154).  
 
According to Golden, the Kennedys’ civil rights actions without doubt 
provoked intense hatred and resentment among Southerners, even if they were 
generally considered deficient by critics (cf. Golden 133). They would certainly 
have been responsible for any kind of racial turmoil if it could be retraced to the 
administration’s course of action. Besides the avoidance of bloodshed, political 
considerations were of course a major argument for refraining from more virtuous 
intervention: ‘The white supremacist hates John F. Kennedy absolutely’ (Golden 
226). As concerns the executive order strategy of the administration, Golden has 
no sympathy for critics who perceive the measure as a weak initiative to avoid a 
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legislative path: ‘Why was this political prerogative on behalf of the Negro so 
bitterly contested? Who said ‘playing Negro politics’ is wrong? In itself bad?’ 
(Golden 33). 
Golden is of the opinion that instead of a moral approach, Kennedy’s 
political strategy was the adequate way to deal with the problem, as a society 
which is political can only be changed by such considerations (cf. Golden 160). 
Yet despite the clear preference for a pragmatic over a moral approach as 
concerns the political sphere, Golden is nevertheless moved by the injustice which 
African Americans had to endure. Discussing the events of the early 60s, such as 
Governor Wallace blocking the schoolhouse door, he shows no appreciation for 
the ignorance of Southerners and their outrageous opinions. Moreover, he 
differentiates between political action and the understanding and appreciation of 
the moral implications. Golden is of the opinion that Kennedy did very well 
consider the moral dimension of the African American struggle and that ‘for this 
reason the racial politics he initiated will eventually succeed, beyond any shadow 
of doubt’ (Golden 36). While many authors have chosen to argue either in favour 
of a moral or a political approach, Golden adds that the moral and the pragmatic 
dimension do not necessarily contradict each other: ‘It is not so strange that the 
one considered the most political, should have become the most personally 
involved’ (Golden 33).  
President Kennedy rarely commented on the civil rights issue, yet he was 
constantly pressed by Civil Rights Leaders as well as by his advisors to speak out. 
Civil Rights counsel Harris Wofford, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and even 
the relatively restrained Burke Marshall at various times urged him to release 
more forceful statements for the sake of moral guidance. There is broad consensus 
throughout literature that the civil rights rhetoric John F. Kennedy displayed was 
‘a regular tactic’ (Glyne 322). While David Niven speaks of an ‘occasional 
rhetorical flourish’ (Niven 19), Lewis Paper argues that the President’s statements 
were ‘on principle, not empathy’ (Paper 161), supported by Maldava E. Glyne’s 
remark that the President tended to express himself ‘mostly in high-minded 
platitudes’ (Glyne 14). In view of the mounting racial crises across the nation, 
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Kennedy apparently ‘felt pressure to deliver some compensatory showmanship’ 
(Branch 822). Harold Fleming seems to be one of the few who perceived the 
public statements as ‘making plain his concern for the racial problem and his 
conviction that it was first and foremost a moral issue’ (Fleming, Federal 
Executive 392). Bearing in mind Harry Golden’s generally positive account, it 
comes as no surprise that Kennedy’s statements find his approval. He points out 
that in many ways, Kennedy was the first politician in such a high position to 
speak out for the civil rights cause and sets out to defend the President by 
advancing the argument that ‘Mr Kennedy did not resort to the hollow safety of 
sane but insipid phrases, even in the heat of a bitter campaign’ (Golden 172), thus 
stressing the frankness and firmness of the President. In a strange reversal of the 
afore-mentioned criticism, the author emphasizes the very fact that Kennedy 
dared to show rhetorical support, a move which had certainly not been targeted by 
any of his predecessors. Interestingly, Golden also states that Kennedy ‘actually 
applauded the March on Washington’ (Golden 175), leaving out the fact that the 
administration initially took great pains to persuade the Movement Leaders to call 
the March off because Kennedy’s Civil Rights Bill was under way in Congress. 
The President feared that senators would conclude that there was not enough 
public support for civil rights legislation if the March failed to attract a large 
enough crowd. As the Leaders could not be pressed to postpone or cancel the 
project, Kennedy made preparations of enormous scope to ensure that there would 
be no acts of violence.  
Despite this misrepresentation, which is probably attributable to the lack in 
information material at the time the book was written, Golden is correct in 
assuming that John F. Kennedy, well-known for his rhetorical aptitude, was aware 
of the huge impact of his public statements and endorsements. Looking at his 
speech drafts, it becomes evident that he was concerned to create adequate 
nuances in language. A statement Kennedy made in the aftermath of the Freedom 
Rider events in Alabama reads ‘The Federal Government, under existing law, has 
an interest in the maintenance of a safe and adequate interstate transportation 
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system.’, whereby Kennedy replaced the words ‘an interest’ with ‘a clear 
responsibility’ (cf. Archival Source #3). 
Assessing Kennedy’s role in the civil rights struggle, Golden finds that  
 
Mr. Kennedy’s significance in the Negro’s advance 
was not so much that he helped him along as that he 
understood his revolution was important and that it 
must succeed […] for the welfare of America. Some of 
the Negroes themselves have failed to see this (Golden 
262). 
 
 
 
4.2 Carl M. Brauer’s John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction 
(1977) 
 
Carl M. Brauer, Assistant Professor of history at the University of 
Virginia, has produced a favourable account on the Kennedy brothers and their 
civil rights efforts. While he is convinced that despite his cautious approach, John 
F. Kennedy would ultimately have decided to advocate change anyhow (cf. 
Brauer 60), he does not avoid debating the negative aspects of the path towards 
racial equality, admitting that John F. Kennedy ‘embodied the spirit of racial 
moderation’ (Brauer 11). Similar to Sorensen and Schlesinger, Brauer attempts to 
portray the President as a leader in charge of the situation rather than guided by 
the force of events he was confronted with (cf. Brauer 72).  
The strengthened focus on employment of African Americans within the 
government is perceived by Brauer as ‘the earliest sign that Kennedy would bring 
about genuine change’ (Brauer 67) and therefore represents the initial source of 
transformation rather than a purely symbolic gesture, as many critics would claim. 
Brauer rejects the common notion that Kennedy remained largely passive until 
mid-1963 and holds that significant changes which marked a definite contrast to 
Eisenhower’s term (cf. Brauer 68) took place already during his first year in 
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office. The author predominantly refers to the so-called token actions of the 
President, which signalled the Movement that the approach of the administration 
towards its plight had changed. Critical voices condemned this kind of action as 
merely geared towards the media, demonstratively showing off the President’s 
good will in order to reassure African American communities of his support, 
whereas in fact no essential steps towards comprehensive legislation were taken. 
Nevertheless, Kennedy’s strategy was somewhat successful in that it was 
immediately processed by the media and therefore served a useful tool to improve 
his public image (cf. Bryant 223). While political strategy certainly was part of 
such measures, it is a fact that the media subsequently aided the cause in that it 
considerably raised societal awareness by making segregation a subject of 
discussion. Those token actions were regularly introduced by the administration. 
That race relations within the United States could no longer be ignored showed in 
John and Robert Kennedy both resigning from prestigious clubs who would not 
desegregate their facilities, such as the Metropolitan and the Cosmos Club (cf. 
Brauer 70). Additionally, desegregated meetings at the White House, both 
concerning negotiations as well as social events, were suddenly on a regular 
occurrence (cf. Brauer 71). Symbolic actions of this kind as well as symbolic 
statements and rhetorical support find Brauer’s approval, as many of those 
measures were the very first steps in the direction of a more forceful commitment 
to the cause. However, the author criticises the Democratic Party’s tactical 
mistake of delivering vigorous civil rights promises in the course of the 1960 
campaign which would influence the way Kennedy would be judged on domestic 
policy from the start. The democratic platform ‘accidentally’ contained the most 
sweeping civil rights pledges the Party had ever produced up to this point (cf. 
Brauer 36) and the overstatement would subsequently lead to the impression that 
regardless of other measures which were introduced, Kennedy had broken his 
promise. Yet this product of campaign strategy was a rather natural outcome, 
considering the nature of campaigning. Kennedy as the prime candidate of the 
Democratic Party obviously needed to take the activist stand on the basic 
questions of policy making in order to create an adequate contrast to Nixon as the 
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successor of Eisenhower’s policy (cf. Wicker 85). In Malcolm E. Smith’s book 
John F. Kennedy’s 13 Great Mistakes in the White House, one of the chapters is 
entitled ‘Betraying black voter’s trust’ and essentially states that Kennedy abused 
his rhetorical power for the sole purpose of gaining African American votes. The 
Democrats had lost a substantial amount of African American voters in the mid-
50s and Kennedy succeeded in re-establishing their trust in the early 60s (cf. 
Brauer 58), largely due to promises that would unnecessarily raise the 
expectations of the African-American community to great but unrealistic heights. 
By contrast, it has also been argued that the Civil Rights Movement organisations 
did raise utopian claims that could simply not be fulfilled by any efforts. As the 
relation between Civil Rights Leaders’ demands and politicians’ efforts was 
continually tense, the Leaders partly ended up ‘the victims of their own rhetoric’ 
(Silberman 219). In the early 60s, the Movement had reached a point where their 
initially patient and only slowly progressing struggle against segregation had 
turned into a more vigorous fight which attracted considerable public attention. 
The African American community stood at a turning point; they were well 
organized and not willing to put up with the moderate approach to their cause 
which many politicians still displayed. Although from the activists’ side the 
preferred course of action was a non-violent revolution, they demanded legal and 
social change to an extent which was unconvertible for many politicians. They 
tended to oppose moderates like Kennedy for what they perceived as half-hearted 
efforts. Yet it has been argued that the Movement profoundly misjudged which 
demands had a chance of succeeding and made the mistake of raising the hopes of 
their followers to unrealistic expectations (Silberman 220). 
Brauer’s position on the issue of symbolic politics reflects that it was 
Kennedy himself who created an atmosphere which made it possible for the 
Movement to perform forceful action in the first place (cf. Brauer 319), a claim 
that fits into the discourse of the Camelot myth1. While Brauer admits that 
Kennedy was reluctant as regards legislation and that tangible results were scarce, 
                                                 
1 Cf. Strober’s definition: ‘[…] in reference to the legend of King Arthur, which was set in a 
magical period not likely soon to be repreated; characterised by grace, wit and intelligence.’ 
(Strober 465) 
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he focuses on what he perceives as significantly constructive efforts which were 
persistently traced throughout Kennedy’s term, centring on communication and 
symbolic gestures. Brauer observes that while the President himself was primarily 
occupied with what was widely perceived as tokenism, the Justice Department’s 
actions revealed the strategy behind those efforts more clearly, not at least 
because most of the governmental civil rights initiatives originated from Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy and his associates. In the Department of Justice, a 
‘disproportionately large amount’ (Brauer 94) of resources was invested in the 
field of civil rights. Especially the Civil Rights Division finds Brauer’s approval: 
‘Its lawyers were litigators, investigators, and agents for change, not Washington 
bureaucrats’ (Brauer 117). The author renders a portrayal of the Justice 
Department’s associates depicting them as commendable lawyers, almost placing 
them on the same level with civil rights activists. It is well documented that 
Nicholas Katzenbach, who served as head of the Office of Legal Counsel (1961-
1962) and as Deputy Attorney General (1962 to 1965) and Burke Marshall, head 
of the Civil Rights Division, were greatly respected by Civil Rights workers for 
their efforts (cf. Brauer 92 – 94). Indeed, the staff at the Department of Justice 
carried out their work in full activity which often involved considerable risk. 
Katzenbach had been the man who had been assigned the ungrateful task to 
confront Governor George Wallace of Alabama in front of TV cameras and to 
negotiate with him in order to prevent a national crisis2. It had been one of the 
major civil rights crises the administration had to handle when Governor Wallace 
decided to defy a federal court order which ruled that two African American 
students were allowed to register at the University of Alabama in June 1963. The 
Governor famously declared he would physically block the schoolhouse door to 
prevent the students from entering the building. After many unsuccessful attempts 
to persuade Wallace to comply, President Kennedy ultimately was forced to 
                                                 
2 For a detailed account of the incident, cf. Robert Drew’s documentary movie Crisis – Behind a 
Presidential Commitment (1963) which captures both the events on-site in Alabama and the 
negotiations in the White House and the Justice Department. Drew has also produced 
documentaries about Kennedy’s run for presidency (Primary, 1960) and the aftermath of the 
President’s death (Faces of November, 1964).  
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federalise the Alabama National Guard. During this crisis, Katzenbach had been 
the key personality upon whose negotiating skills the success of this mission 
largely depended. Another of Robert Kennedy’s associates, administrative 
assistant John Seigenthaler, was sent on site to report on the Freedom Riders’ 
activities when they reached Montgomery, Alabama in 1961. He was beaten 
unconscious by rioting segregationists and left lying on the streets bleeding, an 
incident that presumably assisted in altering the Kennedy’s perception of the 
procedures in the South. Hence, there is ample evidence that the lawyers of the 
Justice Department were busy arbitrating between the parties, often gaining an 
impression of what happened on site3. Several crises were managed by increased 
efforts to communicate with the responsible persons.  
While Brauer readily cites President Kennedy’s mistakes in the area of 
civil rights, he does not only represent the Justice Department as the shining star 
in the institutionalised fight for society’s welfare, but also depicts its lawyers as 
deeply committed to the cause. Brauer avers that the plan of the Department of 
Justice was effective and well devised. The apparent reason it received only 
scarce coverage throughout literature is that although the background is nowadays 
well known, the success of the strategy relied to a large amount on discretion and 
behind-the-scenes efforts. One of the most effective actions was the attempt to 
convince the Interstate Commerce Commission to issue new regulations for 
interstate transportation, whereby the Justice Department succeeded in 
desegregating public transport in the South within the time span of a year (cf. 
Brauer 108). While it was considered unwise to try to approach the strongholds of 
segregation immediately, it was attempted to break them down from within by 
collaborating with local officials who were not opposed to moderate change as 
long as it did not provoke riots or too much public attention. According to 
Brauer’s judgement, the Justice Department, followed by the President, was the 
primary source of action on the front of private persuasion and, more importantly, 
the leading force in evoking societal change.  
                                                 
3 cf. Bryant 269, Brauer 101, primary sources 17 
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While journalist Nick Bryant has repeatedly voiced his incomprehension 
for the fact that Kennedy, while rarely speaking out on critical civil rights issues, 
also refrained from advertising his achievements in the area, Brauer points out 
that this was part of a strategy. Interestingly, Kennedy’s critics commonly 
observed that his ‘actions did not match his words’ (Dallek 590), yet in some 
instances his words apparently would not match his actions. According to Brauer, 
the timing for public statements had to be chosen carefully and the decision to 
keep successes largely unpublicised is easily explained. Extensive media coverage 
would have led to unnecessary debates in the South and would have made people 
aware of what would otherwise have been a quiet transition (cf. Brauer 109). 
Many of the largely unpublicised negotiations with influential local personalities 
constituted a silent ‘triumph’ (Brauer 147) and by setting a precedent, they 
constituted substantial groundwork for later steps to be taken on the legislative 
front on various levels of social life, as for example equal employment legislation 
in 1964. Brauer emphasizes the significance of the ‘Plans for Progress’ project4, a 
measure which has been generally reviewed as having failed (cf. Brauer 150).  
In many instances, Brauer does not assign the failure of certain matters to 
the inadequacy of the Justice Department but to aspects outside of their reach or 
responsibility. The Voter Education Project, for example, was designed to give 
African Americans the franchise, and was based on the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 
and 1960, which provided the Attorney General with the authorisation to 
intervene in cases of discrimination. However, the project failed to make an 
impact on a large scale. Brauer argues that the main reason for the scarce success 
was that segregationists could still resort to economic repression of the African 
American community. Segregation comprised too many areas of daily and 
political life that it was impossible for the Justice Department to control all of the 
loop holes. Therefore, the lawyers focused on programs that would inflict subtle 
change and were neither coercive nor measures specifically guided towards the 
South alone (cf. Brauer 144). The progress in the area of step-by-step initiation of 
voting rights suits was indeed questionable in that it often required a substantial 
                                                 
4 A project which served to improve employment practices among government contractors 
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amount of time and workforce and consequently led to frustrating delays. 
Moreover, the issue of voting was regulated slightly different in various states 
which involved enormous bureaucratic efforts to attack the problem across the 
whole nation (Bernstein 71). Brauer states that the area of voting rights 
nevertheless provided more chances of success than for example federal 
protection in cases of police brutality, a subject which has led to fundamentally 
different views among historians. The author expresses sympathy for Burke 
Marshall that ‘he understandably continued to concentrate his limited manpower 
in the most promising area’ (Brauer 159). 
On the subject of federal protection, Brauer offers a refreshing perspective 
by refraining from a purely moral debate of the right to protection on part of 
African American demonstrators; instead, he attempts to clarify the nature of 
racial barriers as established traditions in the South. Discussing the ‘substantial 
barriers in effective enforcement’ (Brauer 157), he points out that the circle of 
segregationist techniques was not easy to break. If a case of police brutality was 
brought to court, Southern judges and all-white juries would impose only light 
penalties and act according to the long-standing segregationist traditions. Despite 
their best efforts, the Justice Department lawyers were bound to lose in such cases 
(cf. Brauer 158 – 159). It should also be mentioned that the notion of positivist 
law in modern liberal societies implies that legislation is a normative set of rules 
and does not include moral rightfulness as such. From a continental European 
viewpoint, it is equally significant to comprehend the circle of segregationist 
techniques as embedded in the Anglo-American legal system of Common Law. 
Due to the case law system, legal disputes are typically decided on precedence 
and provide judges with the possibility of overruling. They are therefore much 
less bound to a statutory basis. Not only was the administration faced with 
resistance in the courts; segregation continued to be upheld by policemen, 
governors and employers and was therefore deeply embedded in Southern custom. 
African Americans attempting to overcome those barriers were often confronted 
with refusal of credit, boycotts, physical violence, arrests or loss of employment 
(cf. Marshall 34). The creation of a federal police to intervene in cases of physical 
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violence, Brauer argues, was not recommendable as it would most likely have led 
to stronger opposition on part of local officials and further nurtured the climate for 
riots in the states (cf. Brauer 160 – 111). On a political dimension, such an action 
would have put a strain on congressional relations and would have proven 
destructive to a whole range of stable legal traditions. On this subject, Brauer’s 
line of argument is similar to that of Burke Marshall in Federalism and Civil 
Rights. Yet while Marshall’s focus is decidedly more legal, Brauer neither treads 
the legal nor the moral path but maintains the logical claim that Kennedy’s 
constant attempt to avoid alienating the South either by controversial actions or by 
moral statements was beneficial to either party as it represented a measure to 
secure national stability throughout the civil rights crisis across the United States 
for both Movement activists and Southern whites (cf. Brauer 317). Despite his 
sympathy for the Kennedys’ cautiousness, Brauer constantly emphasises that the 
Justice Department indeed wanted to act, yet encountered resistance in many 
cases which left them powerless to produce viable successes (cf. Brauer 160). The 
same applied to President Kennedy for reasons of him seeking to maintain public 
order: ‘He shared the modern liberal’s faith that the central government, led by an 
active President, could and should solve pressing social problems’ (Brauer 317).  
Brauer points out that at times, the Kennedys were the targets of 
unfounded criticism when the Movement suffered setbacks and resistance. 
Furthermore, he hints on the sometimes diffuse organisational problems that were 
surfacing among Movement branches and would later lead to the radicalisation of 
some parts. In contrast to other authors who would merely uphold the moral 
courageousness of the Movement and blame the government for failures of all 
kinds, Brauer dares to suggest that at times the African American community 
itself had trouble to act unified and effectively (cf. Brauer 177). Brauer is the only 
author to suggest that the reason why the literacy bill John F. Kennedy sent to 
Congress in 1962 failed was not least because there had been no support from 
Civil Rights groups, as they had set the wrong priorities and were preoccupied 
with other matters such as school desegregation (cf. Brauer 137).  
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As becomes evident, a substantial part of civil rights work rested with 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who was more passionate about the subject 
than his brother and had a deep sense of empathy for and interest in the lower 
classes (cf. Brauer 91). He also conceived the deep roots of segregation more 
clearly (cf. Brauer 126). The President, by contrast, was willing to offer 
reassurance to the African American community through the power of his office. 
Brauer is convinced that in comparison with all the Presidents which came before 
him, John F. Kennedy was the first to offer moral leadership from the very day he 
took office, and this support ‘took the form of exemplary conduct rather than 
ethical preachments’ (Brauer 74). Never before had it been possible for Civil 
Rights Leaders to have access of this extent to the administration and to the 
President himself (cf. Brauer 73). Moreover, the aforementioned behind-the-
scenes action did not only take place in the Department of Justice. Throughout 
1963, a series of unpublicised White House meetings were initiated to persuade 
religious leaders, business men, lawyers and other key members of society to take 
steps on their own to encourage desegregation. Kennedy made an effort not to 
overburden Southerners with a sweeping change in rules that had persisted 
throughout the South for hundreds of years. Instead, he placed an emphasis on 
voluntary compliance which was also a measure to win Southern Democrats for 
his legislative civil rights plans (cf. Brauer 87). Brauer expresses sympathy with 
the Kennedys in their claim that to act rigorously on moral grounds without an 
awareness of the possible outcome was not commendable: ‘Extremism might have 
had a greater popular appeal in the South in 1962 had the President crusaded for 
civil rights’ (Brauer 143). Yet Brauer does not conceal that political 
considerations were another aspect in Kennedy’s decision-making process. 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s appointment as vice president was part of the strategy to 
have an ally in the South (cf. Brauer 36) and did affirm Kennedy’s tendency 
toward moderation. Ironically, Johnson turned out to be considerably more pro-
civil rights than Kennedy would ever be.  
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President Kennedy has been regularly criticised for appointing 
segregationist judges in Southern states5. While the opinion throughout the 
literature tends towards a political explanation, implying that Kennedy had a 
deliberate ‘deal’ with Southern Governors, Brauer argues that while the President 
was assured they were neutral, the judges ‘turned out to be’ segregationists 
unexpectedly (Brauer 87). He explains that while the decision theoretically rested 
with the President acting upon the suggestions of Senate members, the power of 
the Senators in their respective states was significantly larger than commonly 
assumed: ‘Kennedy was merely following tradition’ (Brauer 121) and would have 
suffered setbacks himself if he had opposed a Senator’s preferred choice. Brauer 
claims that African American lawyer Thurgood Marshall, who had won the 
famous Brown vs. Board of Education case, would have stood no chance to have 
been appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit if 
Kennedy had not, although reluctantly, agreed to a deal with Southern senators. 
The President ‘had very little room in which to maneuver on judicial 
appointments […] it was simply not feasible or even possible’ to appoint 
integrationists to those judicial posts (Brauer 124). However, Brauer avers that the 
better part of judges upheld the law and draws a comparison to the former state of 
inaction in American civil rights politics, a common line of argument in pro-
Kennedy books. In stating that ‘Kennedy actually appointed more integrationists 
in the South than Eisenhower’ (Brauer 123), he seeks to mask the negative 
connotation of Kennedy’s self-made segregationist judges in the South. While 
Eisenhower in this context is often cited by authors as an easy way out to glorify 
Kennedy’s advancement in this area of domestic policy, Brauer has another 
persuasive argument in Kennedy’s defence. He is convinced that Kennedy only 
reluctantly conformed to the traditional policy, as it would have been a 
strategically unwise move to initiate such appointments deliberately. After all, the 
Kennedys’ intention was to seek a solution of the crisis primarily through court 
action and enforcement of existing laws rather than through new legislation. They 
would have set a trap for their own strategy (cf. Brauer 124). In a letter Robert 
                                                 
5 Cf. Stern 47, Bryant 286 – 288  
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Kennedy had written in his defence on the subject in 1964, he states that while the 
appointments were clearly wrong, he does not think that this mistake could have 
been avoided, as there had been no indication that the judges would turn out to be 
segregationists (cf. Archival Source #4). 
For the most part, Brauer is able to defend his positive viewpoint 
excellently, yet at times he creates lines of argument which lead to entirely 
unexpected conclusions. To cite one example, the author suspects that African 
Americans did partly oppose Kennedy because of his Catholicism, which is 
intrinsically a legitimate assumption. Martin Luther King’s father, an influential 
figure in the African American community, initially disapproved of Kennedy 
because of the President’s religion and then suddenly endorsed him because of his 
telephone call to Coretta King while her husband was in prison. While this 
incident has largely been perceived as a purely strategic move shortly before the 
1960 election to gain votes, Brauer twists this argument and states that King’s 
public backup ‘gave considerable space to a refutation of religious bigotry’ 
(Brauer 51), a statement that sounds like a reversal of the crux of this action.  
On the ultimate impact of Kennedy’s civil rights achievements, the author 
concludes that ‘the plus side of the ledger would be considerably longer’ (Brauer 
319). Interestingly, he avers that Kennedy through his actions did open the gates 
for the Movement to act and subsequently supported its ambitions, a claim which 
stresses the limits of credibility, especially when Brauer closes by stating that 
‘Kennedy was significant not only for what he did, but for what he started’ 
(Brauer 320). 
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5 Power and Communication 
 
Brauer’s main argument for a positive judgement of the Kennedys’ civil 
rights efforts is the effectiveness of their communicative, persuasive approach 
instead of the use of coercion. In order to form a deeper understanding of his 
argumentation and to assess the value of his opinion, it is useful to clarify my 
understanding of the background of power and communication in democratic 
societies. In The Active Society, Amitai Etzioni discusses whether or not control 
without power is possible. 
Some theories in political science place a special emphasis on 
communication. They are ‘in favour of a conception of societal guidance based on 
communication without the backing of power’ (Etzioni, Active 333). According to 
this viewpoint, the government is perceived as a communication network more so 
than a power network. The control centres and performing units send messages in 
this network and therefore produce power structures automatically. The key for 
the actor in this model is information, for if it is accurately conveyed ‘correct’ 
action will follow. Etzioni depicts the essentials of this theory by comparing it to 
inserting the right key into the right keyhole, which means that even if there is not 
much power available, the door will open for implementation of the required 
action if the right communicative key is chosen. Advocates of the communicative 
approach would therefore claim that when Kennedy sent troops into the states, the 
power of the implementation depended on the message the President conveyed. 
The dynamics of action largely depend on communication, and while not much 
energy is used in those proceedings, the effects can be enormous. Etzioni, by 
contrast, argues that society consists of power relations which lead to natural 
situations of conflict (cf. Etzioni, Active 351). In power analysis, it is assumed that 
the way to action is mostly accompanied by an expansion of power in order to 
reduce resistance; the degree of action correlates with the degree of power (cf. 
Etzioni, Active 334). The Kennedys tried to avoid showing off their power to the 
South, let alone increase it, and rather relied on communication on a subtle level 
to implement the desired change in society. The confidential meetings with key 
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persons responsible for society’s cohesion, for example in the areas of 
employment, religion, law and business, were to create the basis for change on a 
broad range. 
For a thorough analysis, Etzioni suggests that to understand the different 
behaviours of various actors, we need to know the powers they command and to 
which degree their communication networks operate effectively. The analysis of 
such aspects has been a constant source of conflicting narratives in historical 
writing on Kennedy and civil rights. Often, communication alone will not be a 
sufficient tool of societal control. When messages or signals are being ignored, 
force has to be applied. In Alabama and Mississippi, the Governors of the states 
deliberately denied response and cooperation with the government and were 
confident that the President would ultimately not send troops to the state. On the 
other hand, too much power without adequate communication could probably 
have resulted in violence and confusion, as Brauer has argued. Ultimately, the 
actor’s potential will be greatly enhanced if he knows how to handle both 
communication and power in complementary ways. For Brauer and Kennedy’s 
supporters, the communicative approach represents the basis before any kind of 
power is used, even if legitimately applied.  
According to Etzioni, there exist three basic types of power (cf. Etzioni, 
Active 357): coercive power (military power, physical), utilitarian power 
(economic sanctions, material) and persuasive power (propaganda, symbolic). 
Coercive power was used only as a last resort when President Kennedy was 
forced to mobilise troops into a state. Utilitarian power in the form of withdrawing 
funds from institutions which were unwilling to desegregate was often suggested 
to the administration as a course of action that would produce more results, yet it 
was rejected because it was considered too risky. The approach of persuasion, 
however, was applied by John F. Kennedy himself and in particular vehemence by 
the Department of Justice. It is essential to conceive the two not as separate 
entities but rather as unified in an attempt to follow a joint strategy. While the 
reader of civil rights literature gains the impression that the President and the 
Attorney General alternatively were in a state of complete stagnancy, the 
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unpublicised negotiations, even if sometimes ineffective, were progressing in the 
background all the time. It can be assumed that the communicative strategy was 
born out of a political plan on how to proceed, as the logic behind the White 
House meetings was in the same line as the Department of Justice’s approach of 
giving priority to the art of persuasion instead of imposing their will on reluctant 
politicians and businessmen. Journalist Anthony Lewis has repeatedly pointed to 
this parallel, a thought few authors have pursued (cf. Lewis 117 – 124).  
In order to comprehend why both Kennedys were so fiercely criticised for 
their lack of commitment on a public level, persuasive power in this case should 
feature a further subdivision in two dimensions. First and foremost, the President 
of the United States as a public educator undoubtedly has the duty to inform the 
citizens of the nation about certain deficiencies in the state of society. John F. 
Kennedy rarely spoke out for the Civil Rights Movement, and many would claim 
that he did not provide more than lukewarm set phrases until his TV address in 
1963, despite the fact that he was the first President ever to address the issue at all 
and the first to provide cautious support at least. Etzioni remarks on persuasive 
power that it ‘is exercised through the manipulation of symbols, such as appeals to 
the values and sentiments of the citizens, in order mobilize support and to penalize 
those who deviate’ (Etzioni, Active 358). It was exactly this sort of moral 
leadership which critics claim was missing throughout the better part of 
Kennedy’s term. Considerably less attention has been given to the second 
dimension of persuasive power, that of large-scale ‘hidden’ persuasion in 
unpublicised meetings which Brauer has so extensively discussed. This attempt to 
subtly change deadlocked thought patterns did have significant influence in that 
the strongholds of segregation were avoided while moderates were willing to 
support conversations and to accept constructive suggestions.  
While power is always forced and does not evoke a change in the minds of 
those subjected to it, influence does change citizens’ attitudes, evoking a 
‘respecification of their commitments’ and leaving a lasting impression in that 
people depart from their former views (Etzioni, Active 360). Persuasion is thus 
merely ‘influence on the surface’ as ‘there is really an exercise of power beneath’ 
 40
(Etzioni, Active 360). For Kennedy, the noble option of influence entailing the 
gradual ripening of the nation to a state of awareness where it would voluntarily 
drop the racial barriers did immensely appeal, which is why he chose to apply 
force in the least alienating way: by communication. He initiated a profitable 
strategy of initially approaching people who held key resorts in the social 
structure and who were not entirely opposed to the idea of racial equality. While it 
is impossible to know whether this resulted in persuasion or influence, it can be 
assumed that the outcome was successful and long-lasting. In the long run, 
people’s attitudes were certainly altered. This means that guidance was sought not 
to be imposed from the elite downwards but that allies embedded in the social 
fabric were enabled to assist in subtly changing the climate in order to evoke 
change in US-American society as a whole (cf. Etzioni, Active 360). What 
connects the members of society on an equal level is termed ‘social power’ by 
Etzioni. It is non-hierarchical and ‘rests in horizontal […] relations’ while 
normative control can be used ‘for downward control purposes’, as for example 
when the President asks citizens to follow his instructions (Etzioni, Active 367).  
The Kennedys intentionally chose this indirect route, while at the same 
time delivering an executive action strategy along with rare public statements 
addressing the nation. If the education of society is the overall goal, commitment 
and communication serve to be the most effective weapons of successful action 
(cf. Etzioni, Active 370). Etzioni remarks that 
 
The use of force is associated with such factors as the 
timing and pace of change […] All other things being 
equal, the more overdue and the more rapid the 
transformation of a societal structure, the less need 
there is for order-enforcing organisation; the more 
premature or slow a transformation, the greater the 
need for such organisation (Etzioni, Active 379).  
 
While this statement appears logical, it reveals the complex character of 
the Civil Rights Movement: the implementation of equal rights for all citizens of 
the United States regardless of ethnic background was long overdue, yet the 
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transformation was immensely slow and in many instances required federal 
intervention and regulation. The statement also reflects Niven’s and Bryant’s 
argument that Southern states would not have dared to show resistance in the way 
they did if Kennedy had initiated quick change from the very beginning he took 
office. However, there was no way to know whether or not social change of such 
scope was overdue in the Southern states; there is ample evidence which suggests 
the opposite and a forceful stand on civil rights could also have sparked off even 
more racial violence than was already present to a disturbing extent. Moreover, 
the statement contains John F. Kennedy’s perspective of progress in the area of 
civil rights. He was of the opinion that the nation would automatically transform 
when the time had come, naturally progressing and continuing its process of 
maturation. It also becomes clear that the Kennedys and their staff ‘believed that 
they should set the direction which the Civil Rights Movement should take’ 
(Miroff 239). They not only tried to set the direction, but also the pace of 
progress. It is, however, inherent in the social structure of democratic and modern 
societies that an administration does not only have the responsibility to take action 
if the rights of the nation’s citizens are endangered; its duty also includes the 
willingness ‘to respect informal political procedures, effect compromises and 
preserve tranquility’ (Burner 135).  
The civil rights situation in the early 60s was a time of considerably 
heightened public awareness for the problem, yet not necessarily a time to expect 
the nation to collectively change the basics of the social fabric. The long-standing 
tradition of segregation had a political power of its own in the form of defiant 
Governors who had control over most of their state’s resources and was 
prominently featured in Congress. As regards civil rights, both Republicans and 
Democrats were divided by a North-South ideology.  
Discussing the nature of power in this political constellation, it has to be 
emphasised that Civil Rights organisations such as the NAACP, SCLC and SNCC 
had gained considerable influence in the public space by means of demonstrations 
and sit-ins. These direct action campaigns were an expression of alternative 
politics which were not part of the common application of power. The Movement 
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Leaders were proud of their doctrine of non-violence which proved to be 
strikingly effective. Taking advantage of the media, they were forcing United 
States citizens and people all over the world to be aware of the embarrassing 
policies of Southern states in their effort to counteract the activists. Furthermore, 
direct action strategies such as sit-ins and non-violent demonstrations were tools 
to press the administration to act in favour of civil rights more rigorously. The 
Freedom Rides in 1961 for example were specifically designed to gain President 
Kennedy’s attention and support. As the Movement did not choose traditional 
politics and found ways of organising a powerful new social grouping, it did 
represent a threat to the Kennedys and to traditional politics as such (Miroff 239). 
Kenneth O’Reilly has even gone so far to claim that the Kennedys were 
‘harboring bitterness toward the civil rights activists’ (O’Reilly 211) because they 
disturbed the common notion of power. Kennedy’s slow reaction in the case of the 
Freedom Riders is taken as evidence that he repeatedly made an ‘effort to obstruct 
the civil rights movement’ (O’Reilly 213), an incredibly harsh judgement which 
manipulates the reader to conclude that Kennedy was an enemy of the Movement 
when in fact he received rather pointed responses from many Southern politicians 
for his alleged collaboration with civil rights activists.  
It becomes clear that the complex interrelations of several sources of 
power could be found within the higher and lower social spheres and were 
sometimes even reversed. The President, governmental departments, the 
Congress, the states and the Movement were all in charge of different resources 
and were able to exert influence on various levels. Coercive power was used by 
the President in order to prevent riots, yet it also served as a tool of suppression to 
control the African American community in Southern states. The states could also 
go even further and apply utilitarian power by imposing economic sanctions; 
people often retreated to loopholes to continue discriminative practices. Finally, 
persuasive power, without doubt the most nuanced category, was used by all those 
groups in differing ways. The networks of power were therefore diverse and not 
easy to retrace. However while power is existent in all those spheres, the President 
of the United States is in a special position in that he has to consider several goals 
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and has to respond to the needs and demands of many sub-groups. In his article 
‘Social Justice’, Louis Koenig reflects on the restrictions of the man who holds 
not only the most significant, but also the seemingly most influential office of the 
nation:  
 
The Negro civil rights revolution throws a sharp, 
unflattering glare upon the limitations of Presidential 
power as an instrument of social change. It is one thing 
for the President to issue Executive Orders and 
proclaim high policy; it is quite another to transmute 
policy into action and orders into compliance. In the 
acid test of performance, the President depends upon a 
vast federal bureaucracy and far-flung field 
organisations staffed heavily with local personnel 
(Koenig, “Social Justice” 173). 
 
Koenig correctly points out the basic considerations with this statement. 
Kennedy undoubtedly was restricted in his actions by the mechanics of the 
political process, yet many authors have advocated an argument of a completely 
different kind. They aver that if Kennedy was reluctant to introduce legislation or 
indeed any other kind of measure that would produce tangible results, it would at 
least have been his duty to speak out publicly for civil rights and to have sided 
with the Movement. The subject of this two-dimensional notion of morality in the 
realm of the politician and of the historian is one of the key aspects in the analysis 
of the discourse on Kennedy and civil rights. 
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6 Creating the Kennedy Myth 
 
The myth surrounding John F. Kennedy is a phenomenon which emerged 
well before the President’s tragic death6. The Kennedy clan was a tightly knit 
family network with an intuitive grasp for successful public relations. The new 
media which emerged in the 1960s made it possible for the first time that a 
president had the chance to effectively stage himself in the political scenery and it 
provided Kennedy with the means to create a lasting positive image in the mind of 
the public. In the collective imagination, he was a devoted family man, a skilled 
orator and a competent statesman and still, this reputation lingers on to this very 
day. The Kennedys have become figureheads of the American dream and a 
symbol of the essence of what it means to be American. The assassination of the 
President in November 1963 conserved this image. The two books of Arthur M. 
Schlesinger and Theodore C. Sorensen which will be discussed in detail have 
significantly contributed to the conservation of the Kennedy myth, enforcing the 
public image of a vigorous and charismatic leader. Without doubt, these 
portrayals reflect what Kennedy represents in the eyes of many Americans to this 
day: a President with youthful enthusiasm who by creating the conception of a 
New Frontier provided the United States with a touch of hope and patriotism in a 
time of political despair over both national and international issues. The Kennedy 
spirit of approaching problematic political issues in a juvenile pop-culture way 
‘dampened criticism by its very style’ (Riches 65). This phenomenon partly 
explains why the public responds so favourably to pro-Kennedy books, even more 
so if a personal view of people close to the President is included. Sorensen and 
Schlesinger both published their books shortly after Kennedy’s death, when the 
demand for information about the nation’s assassinated leader had been 
particularly keen. Undoubtedly, Kennedy’s violent death contributed to the 
conservation of his popular status, for the assassination in Dallas naturally 
                                                 
6 The most important writers who have produced favourable biographies of the President include 
Robert Dallek (An Unfinished Life), James N. Giglio (The Presidency of John F. Kennedy), 
Michael O’Brien (John F. Kennedy: A Biography), Herbert Parmet (JFK: The Presidency of John 
F. Kennedy) and David Burner (John F. Kennedy and a New Generation). 
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resulted in collective sympathy among a nation united in anguish. The fact that 
during his political career, ‘Kennedy had been able to deflect a tremendous 
amount of criticism by sheer force of his celebrity, charm and hospitality’ (Bryant 
294) provided the basis for the enormous amount of literature which celebrates the 
Kennedy myth rather than his politics. While Sorensen and Schlesinger in their 
debate of civil rights have certainly idealised Kennedy’s actions, they nevertheless 
provide the reader with valuable background information of what they 
experienced first-hand. Moreover, both authors explicitly state that they do not 
specifically aim at a purely neutral rendering of facts. They recognise their bias 
from devotedly working for President Kennedy, yet they do not try to hide behind 
a mask of neutrality.  
Two books which were produced decades later, namely Sorensen’s 
Counselor (2008) and Schlesinger’s Robert Kennedy and His Times (1978), 
clearly reveal that the authors’ viewpoints have changed in hindsight. They will 
be considered in the analysis of their writings, although not as thoroughly as the 
two main books A Thousand Days and Kennedy. While in the early 60s both 
authors dedicated their writing to the creation of the Kennedy mythology, their 
later books are characterised by a greater willingness to address the weaknesses of 
the administration, even though they expectably set out to defend the President’s 
course of action.  
 
 
 
6.1 Theodore C. Sorensen’s Kennedy (1965) 
 
In his 1964 book Kennedy, Theodore C. Sorensen defends the 
administration’s course of action with dramatic language and unlimited solidarity. 
His style is evidence of his established writing skills, and since he had been the 
President’s primary speech writer, it is not surprising that he knows how to argue 
persuasively in favour of Kennedy’s actions. Nevertheless, leaving his 
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exaggerated rhetoric aside, he provides the reader with valuable insights of a man 
who was one of Kennedy’s closest aides. Sorensen does not shy away from stating 
that a neutral account is not his aim. In the preface, he explicitly points out that his 
portrait will be full of praise due to the pride and conviction the author feels about 
the President. The author criticises that Kennedy in his lifetime had been the 
subject of discussion not for what he did in the political sphere but rather for the 
image he represented which is quite an interesting observation considering that his 
account has become one of the basic sources of the Kennedy myth. His book is 
divided into five major chapters, the first three of which deal with Kennedy’s way 
to the Presidency. The other two entitled ‘Kennedy and the Nation’ and ‘Kennedy 
and the World’ deal with the major issues of his time in office, whereby the latter 
is given twice as much coverage.  
One of the main arguments in Sorensen’s account is that the President was 
confronted with an immensely reluctant Congress, forcing him into a powerless 
situation which required him to postpone his plans to introduce new 
comprehensive civil rights legislation. Sorensen points out the obstacles in the 
Senate and the House of Representatives by giving detailed information about the 
mechanisms of political proceedings on this level of policy making. The chapter 
entitled ‘The Congress’ interestingly features another subsection ‘Kennedy vs. 
The Congress’, stressing the adversary relationship which apparently existed 
between them. The section on congressional issues is one of the few which burst 
with expert knowledge and which is characterised by the notable omission of the 
otherwise regular feature of excessively exaggerated rhetoric. Sorensen’s 
argument is backed by the fact that the Civil Rights Act was finally passed in 
1964 ‘after the longest congressional debate in American history’ (Heale 167)7. 
The fact that civil rights legislation was not introduced until 1963 is explained by 
the lack of support in Congress and the threat of a possible filibuster. It is 
immediately sanctified by the comment that the executive ‘whirlwind of activity’ 
(Sorensen 474) was a commendable alternative. In contrast to the assumption that 
                                                 
7 For a detailed discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, cf. Robert D. Loevy’s To End all 
Segregation, an excellent reference framework containing information on the social background 
and on politicians involved. 
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there had been political deals or a lack of commitment, Sorensen decidedly states 
that 
 
There was no ‘deal’ with Southern Congressmen. 
There was no disagreement with Negro leaders over 
the need for legislation. There was no indifference to 
campaign pledges. But success required selectivity. 
[…] He would take on civil rights at the right time on 
the right issue (Sorensen 476).  
 
Sorensen claims that ‘he [Kennedy] was not forced into this position by 
circumstances beyond his control, as many have written’ (Sorensen 470) because 
the notion that every citizen should be equal had always been his personal and 
moral conviction. While he admits that the actions the Movement demanded were 
at times ‘inconsistent with his political instincts’, he affirms that Kennedy’s 
‘academic judgement’ was in truth ‘a dedication of the heart even stronger than 
that of the mind’ (Sorensen 471). Significantly, Sorensen ascribes Kennedy not 
only an immensely active civil rights orientation but also a strong moral 
conviction, an assumption which was commonly rejected by critical writers. 
Kennedy’s television address in June 1963 represents the total commitment 
Sorensen pathetically calls ‘The Kennedy Manifesto’ (Sorensen 493). Hence, the 
author makes it seem as if Kennedy were vehemently trying to interfere in the 
civil rights conflict out of a personal conviction and sanctifies the President’s 
hesitation to act more forcefully by stating that ‘the reason was arithmetic’ 
(Sorensen 475). Alan J. Matusow more decidedly attributes the delay in action to 
Kennedy’s electoral concerns, arguing that his ‘initial strategy derived […] from 
the arithmetic of his victory’ (Matusow 62) in the 1960 election. Moreover, 
Sorensen gives credit to President Kennedy for making an effort to appoint more 
African Americans to government positions. Tokenism is seen as a useful tool to 
help change the setting for far-ranging social change. The appointment of several 
segregationist judges in the South, a subject which led to substantial criticism 
throughout critical accounts, is revealingly only mentioned in brackets.  
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Despite the harsh criticism Kennedy regularly received from important 
Civil Rights leaders like Martin Luther King or Roy Wilkins, Sorensen 
emphasises that Kennedy and his advisors constantly kept in touch with them to 
discuss their proposals and ideas. Proof of the lively correspondence between 
Civil Rights workers and members of the administration can be found in the 
Kennedy Library. Among the numerous letters there are several telegrams by 
Martin Luther King requesting meetings with the President and the Attorney 
General to discuss civil rights matters. The Movement’s faith in their President, 
even if only initially, is further evidenced by a proposal for the administration’s 
Executive Action strategy of about 80 pages length, in which possible political 
moves in the most significant areas (military affairs, education, employment, 
housing, health services, agriculture) are discussed. The proposal was drafted by 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, one of the most significant civil 
rights organisations, and was submitted to the White House by its chairman Roy 
Wilkins as early as August 29, 1961 (cf. Archival Source #5). This evidence 
shows that the Movement organisations were willing to support the course of 
executive action which was all the administration was prepared to offer at this 
point (cf. Sorensen 67). By no means did the strategy change the close 
collaboration between the Movement and the administration for the worse. 
Ultimately, Sorensen argues that Kennedy’s actions set the stage for later 
developments and paved the way for racial justice. Although he does mention the 
counterarguments that are advanced by Kennedy’s critics, he succeeds in masking 
them by skilful use of virtuous rhetoric. In this manner, he creates an image of the 
President as an active purveyor of the civil rights cause: ‘In the space of a few 
months President Kennedy had made the Negroes’ troubles his troubles and their 
problems his priority’ (Sorensen 503). In his epilogue, Sorensen mentions a 
thought worth considering by accurately remarking that in historical writing, 
heroic figures tend to be respected because of their ability to win a war more so 
than because of their ability to prevent a war. This reference to the nature of 
public judgement points to a basic problem in the discourse on Kennedy: the fact 
that in hindsight, authors tend to take the avoidance of a racial war for granted.  
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In his most recent book Counselor (2008), Sorensen is distinctly more 
critical of the President’s handling of the civil rights issue. He admits that ‘there 
was no Kennedy administration civil rights program in 1961’ (Sorensen 
Counselor 272), yet he still clings to the notion that the passage of comprehensive 
legislation in that field was impossible. Despite the author’s personal approval of 
the movement’s cause, he thinks of himself of ‘also sufficiently pragmatic’ 
(Sorensen Counselor 272) to approach the issue with moderation. In the civil 
rights chapter of his book which seems like an expanded and revised version of 
his account in Kennedy, he has considerably held back with pathetic language. 
The high praise of former times has yielded to a more neutral and balanced 
account of events.  
Among the nine books Sorensen has produced about his time in politics, 
Decision-making in the White House (1963) is one of the most revealing 
publications. Refreshingly scarce in dramatic and exaggerated rhetoric, a feature 
which was used to its full extent in Kennedy, it provides additional insights for a 
sociological analysis of decision-making. In the foreword, John F. Kennedy 
himself points out that while the President enjoys substantial power, there exist 
evenly great limitations (Sorensen Decision XII). Sorensen subsequently sets out 
to shed light on the mechanisms of decision-making rather than rendering a step-
by-step guide. An essential notion is that while lower-ranking units are often 
preoccupied with only one goal, decision-makers in the higher ranks ‘are 
concerned with balancing several goals’ (Etzioni, Active 292). Having to keep in 
mind various and often conflicting goals, ‘a President’s authority is not as great as 
his responsibility’ (Sorensen Decision 27). The Presidency is the only office that 
requires its holder to be an expert in all areas of society. The selection of priorities 
is a demanding task for any politician dealing with the everlasting problems 
society raises. Any decision will entail undesirable reactions on some level. 
Sorensen argues that ‘the President’s entire existence is a continuous process of 
decision’ (Sorensen Decision 6). He then sets out to discuss several ‘basic factors’ 
(Sorensen Decision 7), which play a key role in White House decision-making. 
The office of the Presidency is integrated in the network of the political apparatus 
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which is not to be neglected in analysis, ‘nor, it should be added, is the amount of 
care and thought devoted to a particular decision necessarily proportionate to the 
formality and regularity of the decision-making process’ (Sorensen Decision 19). 
Sorensen shows awareness for the political process as a self-contained entity on 
its own which possesses specific dynamics and is, some might say regrettably, not 
amenable to moral arguments.  
Among the limitations Sorensen perceives in the process of presidential 
decision-making, a constant source of influence is the immediate predecessor, in 
this case Eisenhower, and the examples and boundaries he has established during 
his term (Sorensen Decision 23). Etzioni notes that there exist contextuating key 
symbols (cf. Etzioni, Active 166) which serve the purpose of orientation and are 
embedded in the shared collective experiences of a society: ‘It was argued that 
[…] new civil rights legislation would bring about another Little Rock’ (Etzioni, 
Active 167). This remark points to a key element in the civil rights struggle, as 
Kennedy’s course of action would be determined on the basis of former events. 
Moreover, the Eisenhower administration’s achievements, scarce as they were, 
would constantly function as a yardstick, upgrading the image of the Kennedy 
administration. Any critic of the Kennedys would have to admit that the 
comparison with Eisenhower could not be ignored (cf. Leuchtenburg 129). It 
would always prove helpful to mention, for example, that the Justice Department 
had initiated twice as many cases as the Eisenhower administration had in three 
years (cf. Koenig, Chief Executive 319). Civil rights advocates, while 
acknowledging these differences, would counter that by 1960, the dynamics of the 
Movement had drastically changed and that a comparison to former inaction 
would not justify the fact that there was no adequate responsiveness on part of 
political leaders of the nation (cf. Bryant 467). To eliminate the key symbols 
which signified the administration to hold back, the Civil Rights Movement tried 
to create what Etzioni has termed ‘pseudo-events’ (Etzioni, Active 167), events 
which would be the basis for a new attitude and become new key symbols to be 
inserted in peoples’ minds.  
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Almost every author agrees with the assumption that presidential timing is 
one of the key aspects in successful implementation of his program. Among 
scholars, opinions differ as to which approach proves most promising. In 1960, 
political scientist Richard Neustadt published his book Presidential Power and 
was promptly appointed an advisor to President Kennedy. Neustadt’s ideas are 
clearly reflected in Kennedy’s decision-making process. Hence he believed that 
the first two years of the Presidency should be used for learning and that forceful 
action was not to be introduced until the third year (cf. Light 40). By contrast, 
critics like Niven and Bryant would claim that action in the very first year was 
necessary and the only realistic approach to get legislation through the lengthy 
process of congressional debate (cf. Light 41).  
Apart from key symbols and timing, another crucial aspect in decision-
making is for the observer to comprehend that the process is much more complex 
and widespread in its implementation than commonly assumed. While decision-
making is often attributed to individuals, law professor Alexander M. Bickel of 
Yale University notes that there exists a ‘tendency to exaggerate what one man in 
the White House can possibly direct or even know’ (Bickel qtd. in Donald 138). 
Indeed, for the public and less so for the historian, the apparatus behind policy 
making is hard to grasp in its complexity and is therefore in need of 
representatives and leaders who possess the skill of adequate rhetoric. Their task 
is to speak out for what at first sight seems to be a self-contained and harmonising 
unit. On closer inspection, however, most institutions are characterised by 
substantial inner tensions. In the same way Kennedy did not have the Congress 
under his command, and he was also confronted with a significant North-South 
division of the Democratic Party. The making of policy is often represented in 
written historical accounts as being the deed of only one man. In the same way, it 
is misleading to conceive public figures as allegories of the real conflict by 
creating exemplary figures such as the incrementalist John F. Kennedy versus the 
moral crusader Martin Luther King, which is a tempting conclusion since they 
were the men who carried the burden of public exposure to the media. It is 
therefore presumptuous and misleading to ascribe the failure or impossibility of a 
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measure merely to the ‘incompetence and indecision’ (Etzioni, Active 26 – 27) of 
one man. Etzioni emphasizes that societal units such as Congress play a vital part 
as well (cf. Etzioni, Active 264). The complexity arises from the fact that the 
members of Congress do not act in isolation from each other but depend on the 
properties of the social unit itself. One of the basic problems of the Movement 
was that numerous interest groups opposed to such measures as a civil rights bill 
were often significantly more organised and more effective because of their 
political connections (cf. Wicker 97). It was considerably easier to block a bill 
than to get it through Congress and its subcommittees. Therefore, the ‘deals’ in 
politics need to be comprehended as belonging to the dynamics of the political 
sphere as such, rather than as a man-to-man deal or a moral decision:  
 
Societal decision-making is, therefore, not merely a 
thought-process that balances goals and means but also 
a political process that balances various power vectors. 
Each goals-and-means constellation has, in addition to 
its other relative merits, a different political weight 
(Etzioni, Active 301). 
 
The facts support this view. Lyndon Johnson was able to secure passage of 
60 percent of his legislative proposals in 1965, while Kennedy secured passage of 
only 27 percent of his in 1963 (cf. Light 26). According to Paul C. Light, this 
significant difference cannot be ascribed to the competence or personality of the 
actor but rather to an ‘increase in his political resources’ (Light 26), meaning 
better electoral results and increased congressional support for Johnson. 
Therefore, much what tends to be attributed to a single actor’s capabilities can in 
fact be traced back to external procedures.  
Decision-making in the White House, despite its easy prose style and 
Sorensen’s typical elevation of John F. Kennedy to the Olympus of Presidential 
heroes, refrains from heavy and exaggerated rhetoric and almost strikes a 
scholarly tone by focusing on the political forces which influence a President’s 
decision. Sorensen does not aim at establishing an instruction manual for 
decision-making but rather provides the reader with a promising insight into the 
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mechanisms he has observed while working in the White House. Although at 
times his depiction of the subject sounds extremely vague, he succeeds in 
communicating the basic argument that ‘there are checks and balances within the 
departments and agencies’ (Sorensen Decision 26) and that numerous visible and 
invisible influences differing in scope and force exist: Congress, presidential 
advisors, experts in governmental positions and committees all have a voice in the 
decision-making process. Last but not least, the media plays a significant role in 
influencing the timing of politics and in shaping the nation’s awareness of issues. 
The President is the individual who will ultimately be judged on decisions which 
are to a large amount shaped by men in the background.  
 
 
 
6.2 Arthur M. Schlesinger’s A Thousand Days (1965) 
 
Arthur M. Schlesinger served President Kennedy as special assistant in the 
White House and has produced almost thirty books about American politics. His 
work A Thousand Days is a highly positive account of Kennedy’s time in office, 
yet he knows how to conceal his loyalty to Kennedy and appears more neutral 
than Sorensen, whose unlimited romanticism can hardly be excelled. 
Schlesinger’s volume comprises more than a thousand pages, and not even a tenth 
of it is dedicated to Kennedy’s civil rights policy. As the author was first and 
foremost occupied with foreign policy, it is not surprising that his focus is limited 
accordingly. Like Sorensen, he consistently defends the President’s course of 
action and seeks to list arguments for delays, such as the late issuance of the 
housing order (Schlesinger 939). He considers Kennedy’s waiting for the right 
time to act on civil rights a wise step, although he is aware that this approach led 
to ‘understandable frustration’ (Schlesinger 950) on part of the Movement. 
Nevertheless, Schlesinger praises Kennedy for his presidential qualities and his 
prospective approach to civil rights, stating that he was conscious of the far-
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reaching consequences the issue had on foreign policy relations (cf. Schlesinger 
976). Civil rights was certainly not a primary matter of concern for the President, 
yet he was well aware that the incidents which took place in the area of race 
relations on a domestic basis were of integral importance for the shaping of the 
nation as a whole, especially since the notion of the American dream violently 
conflicted with the way African American citizens were treated in public. While 
the independence movements in Africa were progressing, the public image of the 
United States, a nation renowned for its discourse on values like freedom and 
equal rights for all citizens, was in danger of provoking criticism from abroad. 
Schlesinger repeatedly points to these interrelations and to the fact that they were 
more closely entangled in Kennedy’s mind than was commonly assumed.  
Moreover, Schlesinger approves of the fact that Kennedy viewed potential 
profit for the civil rights cause in social and economic measures that were not 
directly related to the subject, such as the poll tax (cf. Schlesinger 976), an 
argument which points to the superficial analysis of certain critics who 
predominantly focus on the ‘pure’ civil rights measures. While Schlesinger claims 
that Kennedy was always conscious of the urgency and the fundamental moral 
rightfulness of the movement (cf. Schlesinger 931), there was still ‘a terrible 
ambivalence about civil rights’ (Schlesinger 930). Negative events are kept very 
short and are concealed in careful language. The appointment of several racist 
judges in Southern states, which received excessive debate throughout the more 
critical part of the literature on Kennedy and civil rights is simply termed 
‘unfortunate’ (Schlesinger 934) and dealt with in only one sentence. Instead, the 
author focuses on the fact that ‘for the first time in history’ (Schlesinger 934), 
Kennedy did appoint African Americans to important governmental posts as 
lawyers. Schlesinger makes a particular effort to evoke the image of John F. 
Kennedy as an active President leading the nation: ‘Kennedy was faced with a 
social revolution and had to act. That is was congenial to his own nature to act 
made his stand more consistent and more forceful’ (Schlesinger 165). 
A quote about Kennedy’s view on moral leadership (Brauer 44) shows that 
he did understand the necessity for this kind of guidance, and in contrasting this 
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apparent consciousness with the commonly held notion that he did massively fail 
as a public educator it becomes apparent that what initially seems like a 
contradiction is merely a question of differing conception. While critics perceive 
the lack of public statements as stemming from the cautiousness and timidity 
which resulted from political and electoral considerations, Schlesinger takes a 
considerably distinct viewpoint. In a separate chapter, he debates the criticism that 
Kennedy had missed to take a strong stand as a public educator. Despite the 
President’s prevailing image as a virtuosic public speaker, this ability is often 
associated with nothing more than a clever knowledge of how to operate rhetoric 
for its own sake. Especially as regards civil rights, there is a broad consensus that 
‘on no other subject did Kennedy prove so deficient as an educator’ (Miroff 224). 
Schlesinger basically renders the President’s own viewpoint first-hand which is 
based on the assumption that influential statements can only be made in times 
when the citizens of the nation are willing to listen, which commonly implies a 
crisis or a similar event to raise awareness and to create a sense of urgency. In the 
early 60s, the better part of Americans was content with the nation’s prosperity 
and development. Hence, Schlesinger claims that society would not have been 
ready for social change because people were not concerned with a problem that 
only affected a minority (cf. Schlesinger 720 – 722). Therefore, if the President 
issued strong public statements on a constant basis, the use of his rhetorical power 
would be diminished as it would arrive at a point of exhausted capacity, rendering 
this tool of public education ineffective (Sorensen Decision 28). Schlesinger adds 
that ‘Kennedy feared overexciting people about public issues’ (Schlesinger 723) 
when the passion in some parts of the country was already at boiling point.  
Further following President Kennedy’s line, the author argues that timing 
was essential to consider and remarks in the direction of critics: ‘Presidents had a 
better sense of ‘public psychology’ than most of their critics; that was one reason 
why they were Presidents and their critics were critics’ (Schlesinger 721). 
Sorensen joins him in suggesting that a President has a natural talent to grasp the 
nation’s mood, a quality which cannot be deduced from a heightened awareness 
of the results of opinion polls but rather an inherent quality to intuitively assess 
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the national climate (Sorensen Decision 50). It is this very quality that made 
Kennedy the monumental historical figure he became posthumously: despite the 
mistakes and misjudgements with which he has been charged, he knew how to 
respond to the public and how to handle the citizens of a nation in all their facets. 
While he definitely knew how to make use of the media and how to be an 
effective communicator, his outstanding talent is commonly, and according to 
Schlesinger wrongly, associated with his pop-culture image rather than with his 
presidential abilities (cf. Schlesinger 726).  
Neither Sorensen nor Schlesinger doubt Kennedy’s determination and 
principal ability to act on civil rights. The delays that regularly occurred on the 
civil rights front are mainly attributed to external factors. Kennedy’s hesitation or 
his preference to choose a cautious path was always backed by justifiable 
considerations: ‘If they [Presidents] wanted to act, as Kennedy clearly did, it was 
idle to suppose that only a misreading of the political situation or mere indolence 
was holding them back’ (Schlesinger 721). Indeed, many authors appear to 
misinterpret the Kennedy brothers’ actions to be a result of miscalculation and 
error of judgement when, in fact, they simply failed to recognise that precisely 
this course of action was part of the administration’s political strategy. As regards 
the controversial subject of segregationist judges, Schlesinger only devotes a 
single sentence to the issue in A Thousand Days. It was not until his 1978 book 
Robert Kennedy and His Times that he would adequately comment on this 
disconcerting topic. He discusses segregationist judges in the South in much 
greater detail (cf. Schlesinger RFK 304) and even admits that there had been a 
deal between Southern governors and the President. Yet he defends the 
appointments, emphasizing that information had been inadequate and that the 
Kennedy brothers had acted in the firm belief that the judges would be 
trustworthy. Schlesinger softens the scandalous issue by classifying the episode as 
one of the many steps in a politician’s learning process. Similar to Sorensen, the 
author in writing Robert Kennedy and His Times has produced a more critical 
account of the civil rights policies in the early 60s. This change in attitude 
becomes evident in his attempt to create a more balanced account by examining 
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the source of the Movement’s discontent with the administration in the first two 
years of John F. Kennedy’s term (cf. Schlesinger RFK 313).  
Significantly, Schlesinger states in A Thousand Days that Kennedy’s often 
criticised and pejoratively termed ‘lack of ideology’ was part of his self-
perception, as he consciously ‘perceived himself rather as a man who […] 
generally saw reason on both sides of complex issues’ (Schlesinger 724). Indeed, 
it is easy to perceive the merits of the pragmatic political approach: instead of 
rigidly adhering to a deadlocked line of thought, Kennedy set out to react to the 
respective situation he was faced with at the moment: ‚He usually called himself a 
realist or an idealist without illusions’ (White 222). Kennedy was always an 
advocate of dialogue, refraining from either-or solutions and from shutting a party 
off completely. When he held his celebrated civil rights speech in June 1963, he 
did it without a proper speech draft and against the recommendations of most of 
his advisors (cf. Dallek 603). He may not have had an ideology but he was true to 
his decisions which he weighed according to the respective situation: ‘He prided 
himself on being pragmatic, tough-minded. Idealists and romantics annoyed him. 
Quixotic crusades interfered with his careful plans and cautious timetables’ 
(Sitkoff 106). Therefore, it could be assumed that this approach in a way also 
presents an ideology, even though such an assumption appears rather far-fetched 
in a world where people tend to categorise politicians on the political spectrum.  
Schlesinger emphasizes that President Kennedy constantly stayed in 
contact with Civil Rights Leaders and, although not digressing from his course of 
action, was ready for discussion and debate of civil rights proceedings (cf. 
Schlesinger 931 – 953). He also effectively highlights the fact that Kennedy, 
despite regular harsh criticism on part of Civil Rights Leaders, continued to be 
immensely popular among the African American community. While the President 
did not substantially press change in the area of civil rights once he was elected, it 
is astounding that he succeeded in sustaining strong support throughout the first 
two years of his term. The high hopes Frank Sinatra sang about during the 1960 
campaign were kept high continually, presumably because Kennedy was a man 
who was fascinated by the mechanics of the political process and its tricks. As 
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Kenneth O’Reilly put it, ‘Kennedy won the election because he straddled the 
racial fence and Richard Nixon lost because he did the same thing but less 
skilfully’ (O’Reilly 197). Schlesinger cites a poll which shows that the African 
American community, on being asked who had done most for civil rights, ranked 
John Kennedy on place three, right after the famous Movement organisation 
NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People) and 
Martin Luther King (cf. Schlesinger 949). Kennedy continued to keep the balance 
to his advantage for a long time, but in 1963 the time had come for him to take a 
firm stand and declare himself as supporter of the Civil Rights Movement.  
As concerns the decision not to send up comprehensive civil rights 
legislation, Schlesinger shows understanding. He recalls the fact that the literacy 
test proposal in 1962 was killed by a filibuster and that ‘this experience seemed to 
confirm beyond question the President’s judgement’ (Schlesinger 940). The 
legislative program of the Kennedy administration as a whole had experienced 
rather harsh treatment in Congress and each of the five main proposals had faced 
serious obstacles and changes (Wicker 86). When Kennedy finally did send up 
legislation, Schlesinger avoids the common view that pressure from outside 
forced Kennedy to do so and instead clings to the notion of an active leader by 
stating that ‘the President […] perceiving a need for new action […] had decided 
to seek legislation himself’ (Schlesinger 950). Thematically broaching a subject 
that Burke Marshall had dedicated a whole book to, Schlesinger in the chapter 
‘Federalism and freedom’ discusses the deficient protection of demonstrators by 
the government. Similar to Marshall, he argues that while major crises required 
governmental regulations, harassments and smaller offences which would 
essentially require police functions could not be covered by the Department of 
Justice. He calls the efforts of the Kennedy administration ‘impressive’, yet, like 
Marshall, he seems to capitulate without a solution to the realisation that ‘terrible 
facts remained’ (Schlesinger 956).  
Schlesinger points out that the famed civil rights speech the President gave 
in 1963 marked the culmination of his efforts: ‘He had prepared the ground for 
that speech ever since he became President’ (Schlesinger 965). In a chapter 
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revealingly entitled ‘The President in command’, Schlesinger praises the final 
dedication of Kennedy to take a leading role in the movement: ‘He had quietly 
created an atmosphere where change, when it came, would seem no longer an 
upheaval but the inexorable unfolding of the promise of American life’ 
(Schlesinger 966). The last chapter on civil rights titled ‘The Revolution’ deals 
with the Civil Rights Bill under way in Congress, with Lyndon B. Johnson 
successfully finalising what Kennedy had built up over the three preceding years. 
Overall, Schlesinger’s account is characterised by great solidarity with the 
President and an admiration that is easy to decipher between the lines. 
Nevertheless, he has to be credited with his skill for rejecting and disproving 
criticism in a straightforward manner.  
 
 
 
7 The Politics of Incrementalism  
 
Bryant characterises Kennedy’s political style with the observation that 
‘He was an incrementalist’ (Bryant 468). Etzioni provides a definition of this style 
of leadership: ‘They [decision-makers] do not investigate all alternative policies 
but only those which differ incrementally (i.e., to a limited degree) from the 
existing policies’ (Etzioni, Active 270). The scope of realistic alternatives is 
therefore significantly narrowed down by the actor himself. While the opposite 
approach would require the actor to work with fixed aims and to search for the 
appropriate means, the incrementalist primarily considers the means that are 
disposable at the moment and on this basis chooses the goals accordingly. 
Kennedy’s Civil Rights bill was perceived by the Movement’s Leaders as an 
expression of this attitude, as they felt that Kennedy acted according to his means 
instead of according to what was needed at the time (cf. Schlesinger RFK 348). 
As the incrementalist’s goals are by no means stable, there is also no solution in 
that sense, rather a process of constant adjustment to the political situation; the 
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course of action may be redefined with each step. Kennedy’s supporters would 
claim that it was a flexible approach and that the President was ready to listen to 
both sides’ arguments. Critics like Niven, Stern and Bryant, whose arguments will 
be discussed in chapter nine would call the same strategy myopic, overly cautious 
and unstable. 
The one-dimensional view of the President as the major power wielder is 
abolished by the incrementalist approach. Power is wide-spread across various 
organisations and groups, each of which the President has to consider in his 
attempt to keep the balance for a stable society: ‘He has to adjust to their demands 
just as they adjust to his’ (Etzioni, Active 271). Decisions develop out of the 
negotiations between several actors, who are to a great degree ‘affected by the 
structures’ and circumstances they find themselves in (Etzioni, Active 292). It is a 
fact that democracies lean towards the incrementalist approach because the 
strategic implications of their actions require democratic leaders to seek the 
greatest possible support from sub-societies which are constantly in conflict with 
each other (cf. Etzioni, Active 294).  
What civil rights advocates frequently criticise is the ‘double standard’ 
(Etzioni, Active 297) of political leaders, in that they must consider both societal 
and elite needs. An incremental strategy is therefore often favoured, as it tends 
toward the path of least resistance and thus avoids political damage (cf. Etzioni, 
Active 298). The chosen way of action is therefore also the least alienating for the 
decision-maker because he evidently stays within the boundaries of the ‘familiar 
path’ (Etzioni, Active 299) naturally imposed on him: ‘An incrementalist actor 
responds and adjusts: he does not even try to transcend and transform’ (Etzioni, 
Active 305). Although he had done more than any of his predecessors, President 
Kennedy was frequently accused of having been passive. Rather than helping to 
advance the cause, critics argued that ‘one cannot help but gain the impression 
that Kennedy was always reacting to crises’ (Fischer 84). In view of the harsh 
judgement often displayed by scholars, Maldava E. Glyne rhetorically asks: ‘But 
of a moderate, must one not conclude his actions took on a radical form?’ (Glyne 
115). She puts the moral line of argument into perspective by arguing that 
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Kennedy’s failure in certain respects ‘only reveals that JFK does not resemble a 
modern-day Moses’ (Glyne 120).  
Interestingly, the merits of the incrementalist approach did not divide 
administration members and Movement activists along a clear cut line, as the 
literary evidence discussed here might suggest. The public justification and 
appreciation of Kennedy’s course of action did by no means exclusively originate 
in the isolated surroundings of government-affiliated associates. The African 
American community as such built their hopes on their President. African 
American author and journalist Louis Lomax was one of the spokesmen for their 
concerns and clearly expressed the approval his community felt despite constant 
public criticism on part of Movement Leaders. In his book entitled The Negro 
Revolt (1962), he staunchly defends President Kennedy and argues that the 
administration’s efforts in the area of voting rights were essentially reasonable 
because they rather served as preparation for the social change that was to come 
and was thus part of a well-conceptualised strategy (cf. Lomax 232). Kennedy 
was apparently leaning towards ‘testing his power to gain his course before 
choosing which alternative he favors’ (Etzioni, Active 304). The alternatives in 
this case did not consist of the basic decision whether racial equality was right or 
wrong. In Kennedy’s view, the notion of segregation was an absurd concept 
which considerably harmed the economy and had a negative effect on the 
international reputation of the United States. His alternatives lay in the course of 
action he chose to advance the cause of the Civil Rights Movement: by executive 
action or by legislation; by public statements or by remaining silent; by 
intervening in the states or by placing emphasis on voluntary compliance. These 
choices were not made out of moral obligation; they rather represented the step-
by-step processing of a President who had to consider his limitations of power. 
Etzioni states that ‘control is not just a process of information-collection […] and 
the expression of commitments, but also a process of the mobilisation and use of 
assets’ (Etzioni, Active 304), which reflects the quintessence of incrementalism. 
Lomax remarked in 1962 that he was ‘convinced that the President’s civil rights 
critics – including myself – were wrong’ (Lomax 231 – 232). Convinced that 
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voting rights was the most promising area for civil rights activists to tackle with 
the support of the administration, Lomax argues that Kennedy ‘is not naïve’ 
(Lomax 231) and that he deliberately chose a controversial course of action which 
would, however, grant him more freedom to act. Moreover, the author shows 
awareness for the internal struggles of Movement organisations and emphasizes 
the fact that Civil Rights Leaders must mobilise the African American community 
to act on their own, as the government can only provide assistance for the people 
(cf. Lomax 239): ‘The stage is set for John F. Kennedy to fight the civil rights 
battle of his preference on grounds of his own choosing’ (Lomax 235).  
As is evident from the literature, it can safely be said that Kennedy was in 
fact an incrementalist, yet while the term clearly has a pejorative connotation, the 
merits and the reasons behind this form of leadership are easy to comprehend. The 
incrementalist ideology is grounded in realism and in a profound understanding of 
the political process. Considering that President Kennedy had always been ‘a 
purely political man’ (Lomax 231), it was not surprising that he deliberately chose 
to avoid being guided by emotional concerns and instead advocated a politics of 
compromise which would allow him to respect the differing demands throughout 
the nation.  
  
 
 
8 Off the beaten path 
 
Among the close advisors of both President Kennedy and Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy, there are two former associates who have produced 
accounts which reflect unique viewpoints in the otherwise rather sharply 
diverging books. Their writing lies in between the high praise and the adverse 
criticism of other authors and displays specific features unique to the discourse on 
the Kennedys and civil rights. Both authors are known to be vigorous defenders of 
civil rights with strong connections to the Movement and its leaders, yet they 
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prove to be fundamentally different in their area of expertise and interest. Harris 
Wofford’s Of Kennedys and Kings is characterised by deep devotion to the civil 
rights cause with a relatively unexpected sympathy for President Kennedy’s 
course of action. The author’s profound understanding of the political 
mechanisms in the early 60s and his own contributions to the political sphere lead 
to a profound, yet critical examination of the administration’s civil rights 
achievements. While he finds fault with Kennedy’s tendencies toward 
incrementalism, he clearly understands John Kennedy’s motives. Burke Marshall, 
by contrast, focuses on legal proceedings, whereby he deliberately distances 
himself from the commonly mentioned and obvious arguments for moral 
righteousness. His account is even more outstanding in the discourse about the 
Kennedy brothers and civil rights as it covers an area whose mechanisms are 
difficult to comprehend for the layman. He touches upon the very essence of the 
civil rights problem, namely the discrepancy between the law as it is written and 
the law as it is enacted. Of course, the law is widely perceived as an expression of 
justice, yet the inevitable blank gaps tend to be overlooked for the sake of 
categorisation efforts on part of those who seek to explain certain phenomena. 
Wofford and Marshall do not attempt to mask those grey areas which commonly 
lead to feelings of helplessness and impotence. While it is easy to accuse them of 
lack of originality because they both refuse to provide definite solutions, they 
show the courage to leave some questions unanswered. This sense of reality 
proves to be more persuasive than a complaint about a lack of morality in the 
political sphere. Both authors, although inevitably biased, provide the reader with 
a unique and indispensable insight into the activities of the civil rights specialists’ 
work for the administration.  
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8.1 Harris Wofford’s Of Kennedys and Kings (1980) 
 
In analysing Harris Wofford’s book Of Kennedys and Kings, the author’s 
background is of integral importance to understand his role and judgement. In 
1960, Harris Wofford had been one of President Kennedy’s campaign workers. 
One year later, he was appointed Special Civil Rights advisor to the President, a 
position which he readily embraced. Subsequently, he proved to be a staunch and 
emotional advocate of civil rights, establishing close bonds with civil rights 
activists. After merely one year in this position, Wofford resigned to spend time 
on the Peace Corps project in Africa. It should also be mentioned that Wofford 
would have been the ideal candidate to head the Justice Department’s Civil Rights 
Division, a position which was ultimately occupied by Burke Marshall. Robert 
Kennedy remarked that he ‘didn’t want to have someone […] who was not 
dealing with facts but was dealing from emotion’ (O’Reilly 203). 
After contrasting the Kennedy admirers with their critics, Wofford 
explicitly states that he hopes to contribute to a more nuanced view of Kennedy’s 
civil rights approach. He finds that there are valid arguments on both sides and 
thus seeks to produce ‘not a compromise between extremes, but a significantly 
different conclusion about Kennedy’s character and approach, and about the 
political process’ (Wofford 130). The title of the chapter ‘Kennedy action and 
inaction’ clearly reveals the balanced nature of the book. The afore mentioned 
biographical details have led many authors to believe that Wofford had always 
been immensely frustrated with Kennedy’s handling of civil rights and was 
therefore equally critical. In his book, however, Wofford dissipates such claims by 
arguing that while he was at times disappointed with the progress, he mostly 
understood the President’s motivation behind his actions and inactions. Reflecting 
the image of Kennedy as regards civil rights, he criticises that 
 
[…] revisionist historians and ideologues have deflated 
and distorted that period on American politics almost 
beyond recognition. In doing so, they contributed to 
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the cynicism about all government that has paralysed 
our politics (Wofford 4). 
 
Wofford is typically associated with two key civil rights incidents. Shortly 
before John F. Kennedy was elected President, Martin Luther King was arrested 
in Birmingham, Alabama, which prompted Wofford to advise Kennedy that he 
should make a telephone call to King’s wife to reassure her of his assistance. The 
call was widely unpublicised, yet it entailed forceful public responses from Martin 
Luther King’s father and Coretta herself. Merely a few days before the election, 
campaign workers distributed two million copies of a pamphlet with those 
favourable statements in the African American communities (cf. Lewis 116). With 
regard to Kennedy’s narrow victory in the election, the phone call to Coretta King 
was identified by many as the decisive factor in winning black votes. However, 
Bryant cites poll results which show that Kennedy had won a large number of the 
black vote well in advance (cf. Bryant 188). Bayard Rustin, an African American 
civil rights activist and member of the SCLC, writes in his book Strategies for 
freedom that he was well aware of the political risk John F. Kennedy’s call to 
Coretta King entailed (cf. Rustin 47), as it could have alienated Southerners and 
might therefore have even had a reverse effect. Robert Kennedy was said to have 
been furious about this move, as he was convinced it would make them lose 
several states (Wofford 19). The fact that Kennedy did make the call, even if it 
was purely out of political calculation, shows that politicians could not simply 
ignore the status of African Americans anymore (cf. Rustin 48). Rustin considers 
the call as a gesture ‘of enormous symbolic importance’ (Rustin 47). Coretta King 
herself approved of Kennedy’s call because she was convinced that it helped the 
Movement, even though she was aware of the political implications (cf. King 
228). Wofford does not shy at correcting various accounts of events he witnessed 
written by other historians or former members of the administration. He draws 
upon Sorensen’s Kennedy and claims that Sorensen’s account of the call to 
Coretta King is incorrect, as there had been no advice concerning the call in 
advance, simply because no-one knew of it (cf. Wofford 27). Furthermore, he 
accuses Journalist Theodore White of drawing inappropriate conclusions about 
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the President’s phone call and Robert Kennedy’s subsequent call to a judge in 
Alabama who would arrange King’s release from prison: ‘His view of a 
centralized super-efficient Kennedy operation would not let him write otherwise, 
but that is not how it happened’ (Wofford 27).  
Furthermore, Wofford is known as the man who drafted the 
administration’s executive action strategy, recommending a minimum of 
legislation and a maximum of executive action, something Kennedy would 
subsequently be harshly criticised for. In his book, the author attempts to clarify 
the President’s and his own motives for the delay of legislative progress:  
 
Since Kennedy has been blamed by so many critics for 
not seeking legislation during his first year, and in 
some writings I have been exonerated as a civil rights 
activist who was outflanked and overruled, the record 
should be set straight (Wofford 136). 
 
Wofford’s recommendation not to impose legislation from the start was 
triggered by the fact that the Democrats had lost seats both in the Senate and the 
House of Representatives, whereby they were more likely to face a filibuster 
evoked by adversarial forces. He knew that without the power to break a 
filibuster, the failure of a Civil Rights Bill would put other crucial parts of the 
administration’s program at risk as well. Moreover, Kennedy needed to appeal 
both to Northern and Southern democrats in order to pass legislation later on and 
to be re-elected (Wofford 136 – 138). Thus, Wofford essentially cites the very 
same reasons that have often been perceived as unconvincing excuses as the issue 
of congressional obstacles tends to be raised frequently by Kennedy’s most loyal 
and idealising supporters, such as Sorensen and Schlesinger. The enforcement of 
existing laws and the path of executive action were often perceived as ‘the only 
realistic ways’ (O’Brien 378) to act. Hearing those arguments from someone who 
was personally involved in the civil rights cause and who actually advised the 
President to delay legislation adds significantly more credibility to the scope of 
power the administration had at its disposal. Etzioni emphasizes that besides 
knowledge and normative commitment, power is a major influence on decision-
 67
making because it is much more direct. While the other two aspects can be 
disregarded, power is a variable that is better not underestimated:  
 
A President might ignore the information that Congress 
will not pass a bill he favors, but this will not alter the 
fact that when the vote comes, the bill will not be 
approved; the decision will be shaped directly by 
power (Etzioni, Active 303). 
 
As the degree of power ultimately determines the success of a measure, 
the President did not only have to acquire knowledge about the demands and the 
urgency of the Movement but also about what he could safely dare to do on a 
political level. Reflecting such considerations, Wofford expresses his sympathy 
by remembering that 
 
Coming into the Oval Office with a focus on civil 
rights, I recognized how many pressing problems were 
on the President’s periphery, and how difficult it must 
be to deal with them all equitably, if not always equally 
or equably (Wofford 132). 
 
Power analysis is an essential prerequisite for the exploration of the 
decision-making process and it has to be taken into consideration that actors need 
at least minimal power to be able to implement the required strategy. Whether 
Kennedy had enough authority in Congress remains a matter of dispute and has 
been proven and refuted by various writers. It can however be argued that he 
definitely held another kind of power in the form of public statements, which 
would eventually lead to a successful implementation of persuasion and influence.  
That Wofford himself was often torn between the political considerations 
which had to be borne in mind and his emotional devotion to civil rights becomes 
clear in several passages of his book. While he understood for example why 
Kennedy postponed the long-awaited executive order on federal housing, he 
regrets ‘the way he made the decision’ (Wofford 124) which was always a last-
minute back off, while Wofford urged him constantly to live up to his promise. 
These frequent setbacks, coupled with the fact that his recommendations were 
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often simply dismissed by the President, were a constant source of frustration for 
Wofford. In other text passages, however, he concedes that this did not stop the 
administration from introducing other relevant measures: ‘On fronts other than 
Congress and housing, the first hundred days were full of action for equal rights’ 
(Wofford 141). Although he does not doubt Kennedy’s moral attitude, he 
criticises that there was never a long-term strategy on civil rights. Moreover, he 
regrets the lack of sufficient debate on the issue among White House staff (cf. 
Wofford 133). Realising the fact that the civil rights issue was constantly 
competing with other political considerations, Wofford was aware that the setting 
of priorities ‘would sometimes be painful’ (Wofford 140). While the author 
argues that it is wrong to think that nothing more could have been done by 
Kennedy, he finds the assumption that moral persuasion could have caused a turn 
in the nation’s collective mind ‘even further from the truth […] the confusion was 
too deep’ (Wofford 176). Despite the fact that Wofford himself was an advocate 
of enhanced public statements on civil rights, he seemed to be aware of its limited 
impact even of someone as rhetorically apt as Kennedy.  
Wofford’s book differs significantly from other accounts of former White 
House staff members discussed in this thesis. He makes an effort not to omit the 
basic arguments, be they positive or negative, and succeeds in creating a balanced 
view of the issue that neither seeks to idealise nor to condemn. The author does 
not shy away from voicing serious criticism, yet also does not hide his apparent 
deep respect for John Kennedy: 
 
What is truth about John Kennedy and civil rights 
[…]? This much seems clear to me: Kennedy was no 
hypocrite nor did he play politics as usual with civil 
rights […] and learned through politics (Wofford 175). 
 
Wofford himself is unsure about how the civil rights issue would have 
been approached best and how social change could be ideally advanced. Etzioni 
notes that social change proves to be a slow process, and that ‘bit reforms are 
much more likely to be “carried” than fundamental changes’ (Etzioni, Active 242). 
The climate for change is naturally more ideal if the environment is changing as 
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well (cf. Etzioni, Active 243), and while the Northern states were relatively more 
progressive, segregation had a long and deeply rooted tradition in the South which 
constituted a lasting influence on the politics of the nation as a whole. Throughout 
the United States, progress was by no means on the same level which made it 
even more difficult for the President to find an all-encompassing solution. These 
considerations probably were on Wofford’s mind when he wrote the pensive 
sentence: ‘It may well be that the President was right, in the long run, to let things 
ripen as they did’ (Wofford 176). 
 
 
 
8.2 Burke Marshall’s Federalism and Civil Rights (1964) 
 
During John F. Kennedy’s presidency, Burke Marshall was Assistant to 
the Attorney General and Head of the Civil Rights Division in the Department of 
Justice. In 1964, he produced a book called Federalism and Civil Rights in which 
he focuses on the legal dimensions of the African American struggle. The book is 
based on the Gino Speranza lectures which were held by Marshall at Columbia 
University in the same year.  
In the foreword, Robert Kennedy states that Marshall sets out to explain 
the ‘apparent anomalies’ (Marshall VII) in the Kennedys’ approach to civil rights, 
lining out the possibilities and restrictions of governmental action. Marshall point 
out that the legal system of the United States gives great authority to the states 
while the federal government can only intervene under certain circumstances and 
therefore deems it ‘necessary to be realistic’ (Marshall 3) about what can be 
achieved by presidential powers. Sorensen supports him in this argument by 
stating that in many cases, ‘there was no clear-cut Federal solution’ (Marshall 
478). Critics however perceived the lacking efforts in the area of federal 
protection as a deliberate action of ‘throwing another bone to segregationists’ 
(O’Reilly 209). Yet when the government had the right to intervene, it could 
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nonetheless not make sure that discrimination was fully repealed because the 
states often resorted to a range of other tactics to refuse the ballot and other basic 
rights to African Americans. Within the circle of civil rights activists, Marshall 
was a well-respected man, described by Ralph Abernathy of the South Christian 
Leadership Conference as an ‘honest and even-tempered man with whom we 
would be working over the years’ (Abernathy 260).  
Marshall’s account clearly aims at eliminating some of the 
misunderstandings between civil rights advocates and opponents by focusing on 
the crucial tool that necessarily has to be the guideline for the actors on both sides: 
political facts and the rules of the political system. It is evident from the beginning 
that this is not a book which fits into the conventional literary discourse on civil 
rights8. It is not only the fact that Marshall is a biased observer of events on the 
front line like Wofford, Sorensen and Schlesinger. He makes an effort to give his 
account a distinctly more scholarly note by focusing on the legal dimension, 
whereby he attempts to explain the mechanisms behind the proceedings of the 
Department of Justice in a style whose function is to convey the complex contents 
in lucid language. Apart from Marshall’s attempt to clarify the Justice 
Department’s working methods, there exists a special symposium of the North 
Carolina Law Review which was issued in 1963 and is composed of articles by 
Robert Kennedy and his associates who attempt to shed light on the legislative 
facts concerning civil rights. With a focus on issues such as employment, housing 
and school desegregation, the lawyers go back in history and reflect upon 
‘concepts of liberty and equality’ (Law Review 87) to strengthen their positions. 
Martin E. Sloane, for example, defends the Executive Order on housing by stating 
that ‘its true significance lies not so much in its coverage (…) but in the splendid 
fact that it was issued’ (Law Review 134). Moreover, they admit that the judicial 
process is an often tedious ‘process of education’ (Law Review 134), something 
which Marshall more than once experienced first-hand.  
                                                 
8 In the area of civil rights, books tend to focus either on the Movement (cf. Branch, Brooks, 
Riches), on civil rights policy (cf. Ashmore, Light, Loevy)  or on the interrelations between the 
two (cf. Brauer, Bryant, Wofford), whereas accounts with a distinctly legal focus essentially 
require profound legal knowledge by the reader. 
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Marshall’s book is divided in two sections which focus on the right to vote 
and on what he terms ‘The Administration of Justice’ (Marshall 42). As do most 
of the former members of the administration, he stresses the importance of the 
right to vote and explains the working methods of the Department of Justice and 
their successes by citing various exemplary cases, whereby he points out that the 
process of litigation requires much time and effort, thus being a tedious process 
and not a tool to inflict change quickly. The legislative documents which can be 
found in the archives of the Kennedy convey an idea of the workload behind such 
drafts and proposals. The issue of voting was considered the most significant area 
in civil rights, as the Kennedy brothers ‘believed, and correctly so, that blacks 
could not enter the mainstream unless they could vote’ (Brooks 170). Although 
Marshall conceives the urgency of the racial problem in its complexity, he 
defends the political system because it represents ‘notions which have worked, 
and worked well, in other contexts’ (Marshall 50). He furthermore claims that the 
members of the Civil Rights Movement often have often misinterpreted the legal 
and political background to their problem: ‘Apparently their schools and 
universities have not taught them much about the working of the federal system’ 
(Marshall 49).  
The basic question Marshall is concerned with is whether there exists a 
need for altering the area of responsibility of the state and the federal courts, a 
matter which is made even more difficult by the fact that the discriminative 
situation in the United States in the early 60s did not have the same scope across 
the states and was definitely more urgent in the South (cf. Marshall 59). While the 
approach of the Department of Justice of filing suits in discriminatory instances 
turned out to be a promising starting point, Marshall points out that once it 
becomes possible to ‘retest basic constitutional decisions, no one obeys the law’ 
(Marshall 80). This would also lead to a fundamental loss of authority in local 
institutions, disturbing the balance of the federal system established by the 
Constitution. The states, by not complying with the law, were forcing the 
government to intervene under certain circumstances and subsequently felt 
betrayed. They accused the Kennedy brothers of dictatorship and denunciated 
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Civil Rights organisations as having communist tendencies. They created an 
atmosphere of hate in the Southern states by claiming that the government was 
imposing its will upon the American people, as the President had the power to 
sanction the states if they did not comply. The hatred which arose from the South 
is evidenced not only in public statements of local officials, but also in efforts to 
publicly denounce the Kennedy administration. John C. Satterfield, a Mississippi 
lawyer and former President of the American Bar Association, wrote a lengthy 
article complaining about the way the Kennedys practiced ‘government by 
intimidation’ (cf. Archival Source #6). In 1963, the ‘Mississippi General 
Legislative Investigating Committee’ with the backing of Mississippi Governor 
Ross Barnett issued a report in which they accused US marshals of having used 
physical violence on demonstrators during the effort of desegregating Ole Miss. 
The ludicrous reproaches are without foundation of any kind, as numerous 
journalists did cover the event, with no-one reporting anything close to it. This 
evidence supports the view that Kennedy’s actions were deeply despised in the 
South and were violently fought (cf. Archival Source #7). 
The roots of the problem thus seem to be the fundamental 
misunderstandings between civil rights workers and members of the government 
and the Department of Justice, which is more actively involved in the actual 
process of eliminating discrimination on a broad scale. A letter written by the 
Attorney General in 1964 after a meeting with Movement Leaders points to this 
problem: 
 
The difficulty in my judgement, was that I was seeking 
recommendations as to what could be done to make 
things better, while the group present was interested 
only in expressing the depth of their feelings on how 
bad things were. I think my record in this area should 
be looked at as a whole. I am frankly proud of it 
(Archival Source #4). 
 
It is not surprising that the struggle of African Americans for equality is an 
emotionally charged issue, yet in estimating the realistic scopes of their goals 
Marshall doubts whether moral rightfulness can be a useful argument in the 
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settings given at the time. In fact, he dismisses this way of arguing, a common 
technique among Civil Rights Leaders, by stating that sometimes ‘arrests might be 
wrong, but that is not the question’ (Marshall 73). The only question that 
ultimately matters is whether actions of any kind are legally justified or 
unjustified and how they are regulated by the law. However, Marshall’s book is 
not a vehement defence of governmental actions seeking to conceal other points 
of view; on the contrary, he obviously advocates an understanding of how 
decisions are being made in the highest spheres of policy-making. Although the 
author concludes that there is a need for new legislation on the civil rights front, 
he has no definite solution to propose for implementing it. He understands the 
frustration in the civil rights camp as concerns governmental actions, yet claims 
that the Department of Justice did undertake piecemeal, but nevertheless 
significant first-time changes in many instances such as voter registration.  
It is essential to note that the book was generally well received in its year 
of publication and got favourable reviews for Marshall’s efforts to openly discuss 
the matter, although some critics found reason to doubt his line of argument. In a 
review of December 1964, critic Howard N. Meyer finds it regrettable that 
Marshall’s book instead of giving constructive advice does merely defend the 
working methods of the Department of Justice, pigeonholing critics as drawn by 
ignorance for the workings of the federal system (Archival Source #8). By 
contrast, Alexander M. Bickel in ‘The New Republic’ finds that Marshall’s 
approach is ‘modest, even self-effacing’ (Archival Source #9) and ultimately 
concludes that ‘the Kennedy administration made a great record on civil rights. 
Much of the credit is Mr Marshall’s, and the quality of this book indicates why’ 
(Archival Source #9). William W. Van Alstyne writes in the Fall edition of the 
‘Villanueva Law Review’ that Marshall does not merely number the 
administration’s great deeds to produce a favourable account but emerges in an 
honest discussion of the legal problems at hand. Alstyne agrees with most of 
Marshall’s views, yet he criticises that while it is true that there is ‘a large 
measure of good faith in the integrity of state governments’ (Archival Source 
#10), Marshall apparently states several things as facts which are more matters of 
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policy. This applies, for example, to the appointment of segregationist judges in 
Southern states (cf. Archival Source #10), an issue that has caused conflicting 
views among authors concerning the question whether the Kennedys did have a 
voice in the matter. While Marshall makes it seem as if the rule required that 
Southern senators determined whom to appoint, it was rather the case that they 
proposed a suggestion on the basis of which the President made his decision. It 
was rather a political tradition that the proposals of Southern senators were 
usually accepted. Thus, power was at best an indirect consideration in this case. 
Of course, this slight difference in perception remains unnoticed by the legally 
unskilled reader, who relies on Marshall’s expertise to accurately present the 
facts. Ultimately, Alstyne argues that it is possible to achieve greater successes for 
racial equality even within the limits of the federal system. Furthermore, the 
painful experience of ineffectiveness should make it clear that something has to be 
done even if this would mean leaving the comforting zone of existing legal 
boundaries (cf. Archival Source #10). John M. Pratt is convinced that Marshall, 
known to be a civil rights advocate, was troubled by the minimal results the 
Department of Justice achieved: ‘As I read his book […] I kept waiting for him to 
explode, “Damn the federal system – it’s time for justice.”’ (Archival Source 
#11). Yet Marshall fails to defend the federal system enough to make up for the 
outrageous failures and gaps it produced in the civil rights area, to the extent that 
there is an ‘almost macabre quality about it’ (Archival Source #11). Pratt 
nevertheless shows understanding for Marshall refraining from a harsh attack 
concerning the failures of Southern officials, as this would apparently not have 
been wise in his position.  
Arthur Schlesinger, who conceives the book as ‘packed with perplexity 
and near-despair’ (Schlesinger RFK 305), is of the very same opinion as Marshall. 
Noting that the complex segregationist system of judges, juries and state police 
cannot be wholly overcome by federal intervention, he points to the dangers of 
political manipulation of public opinion in the South. Enhanced control on part of 
the administration was often interpreted as a totalitarian tendency, yet while such 
apprehensions were clearly overstated the reactions to such claims certainly had to 
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be considered by the President. In any case, disturbing the federal balance ‘was 
not to be lightly discarded’ (Schlesinger RFK 306). Schlesinger distinctly 
contrasts the two alternative and equally unsatisfying viewpoints: either Kennedy 
could have accepted violence while upholding the system, or he could have 
protected the activists while risking a rupture in federal-state relations. He did not 
choose the latter, for there was no way to predict the possibly extremist 
consequences of this move. Furthermore, the author points out that even the 
famous African American civil rights lawyer Thurgood Marshall agreed with the 
administration’s conception of federalism. The root of the problem was that while 
lawyers could at least understand their way of thinking, the average citizen could 
not comprehend the seemingly inhumane reaction to the death of innocent citizens 
(Schlesinger RFK 305).  
Marshall undoubtedly deserves credit for his attempt to line out the 
motives behind the actions of the Department of Justice. Federalism and Civil 
Rights apparently has its weaknesses, yet they remain invisible for the average 
reader and require detailed legal knowledge to be detected. Simon Lazarus III, a 
distinguished Chicago lawyer, has produced a fervent attack on some of 
Marshall’s interpretations in his article “Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights” 
which was published in The Yale Law Journal in 1966 (cf. Archival Source #12). 
However, while a thorough analysis can only be based on legal expertise in the 
area of civil rights, it can be said that the law is often a matter of interpretation. 
Marshall was certainly not in the position to present legal aspects wrong on 
purpose, but his layout of some issues has led to some critics challenging his 
views. The debates lead to contradictions and obscurity, making the reader realise 
that even the legal system of which we tend to think in either/or and right/wrong 
dimensions, is not immune from containing grey areas; and this is essentially what 
Marshall sought to demonstrate in writing this book. In the scarce length of 
eighty-five pages, he has succeeded in delivering a concise statement on civil 
rights of tremendous informative value.  
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9 Reconstructing Kennedy 
 
Professor of History Harvard Sitkoff has observed that ‘scholars hold 
Kennedy’s presidency in considerably lower esteem than does the American 
public’ (Sitkoff 25), a fact which is easily observable in literature. While Sorensen 
and Schlesinger satisfied the need for the books suitable for the mass, there exists 
a wealth of critical books which are not as well-known or even slightly as popular. 
The last group of authors includes three of the harshest critics of the 
Kennedy administration’s civil rights policy. Despite similar views and 
arguments, each writer focuses on specific features worth analysing in depth. The 
titles alone suggest their critical attitudes: The Politics of Injustice bears a strong 
moral connotation, Calculating Visions conveys the discrepancy between 
pragmatic and morally guided policy making, and The Bystander relates to the 
President’s apparent passivity and inaction. All three imply dissatisfaction with 
the course of action that was chosen by the Kennedy brothers in regard to civil 
rights. In none of the other books discussed in this thesis have authors stated their 
point already thus explicitly in the title, with the exception of Carl M. Brauer, who 
hints at Kennedy as the leader of the ‘Second Reconstruction’. The President’s 
critics find fault with his exaggerated caution, his passivity and his tendency 
toward incrementalist decision-making, all of which are characteristics which 
Kennedy’s supporters did not avoid but interestingly interpreted as strengths in 
view of the unstable situation on the domestic front.  
David Niven’s account The Politics of Injustice could certainly be referred 
to as the very antithesis to Theodore C. Sorensen’s excessive praise of the 
Kennedy Presidency. While Niven makes an effort to emphasize the political 
benefits which would have resulted for the Democratic Party had Kennedy 
decided to support civil rights from the beginning of his term, his harsh and at 
times even offensive language suggests an even stronger emotional involvement 
and moral conviction. By contrast, Mark Stern, in his book Calculating Visions, 
delivers a rigorously categorised classification of ‘good versus bad’ which leads 
to a neat black-and-white depiction. For the sake of clarity, Stern attempts to 
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illustrate the complexity of the issue in a way which is accessible for the reader, 
yet he also conveys the impression of oversimplification. Finally, the 2006 book 
The Bystander by Nick Bryant is probably the most detailed account to date. The 
author formulates his criticism clearly, and while he makes an effort to represent 
both sides of the conflict, his negative conclusion seems plausible to the reader.  
In analysing the critical viewpoints, the diverse scope of the discourse on 
the Kennedys and civil rights becomes visible. It is the last piece of the puzzle 
which will allow for a differentiated understanding of how historical writing 
constructs what we conceive as reality. 
 
 
 
9.1 David Niven’s The Politics of Injustice (2003) 
 
Political scientist David Niven has without doubt produced the most 
critical account of the Kennedys and civil rights. Both his harsh judgements and 
the aggressive tone of his language portray the Kennedys as inactive and 
overcautious. His conclusion of what Kennedy has or has not achieved is 
presented already in the preface and does not spare personal opinions of the 
author or derogative phrases such as the statement that his book deals with 
Kennedy’s ‘near-political schizophrenia on civil rights’ (Niven XV). The author 
points out that  
 
while historians have overwhelmingly accepted 
Kennedy’s assumption that moderation on civil rights 
was politically prudent, The Politics of Injustice 
advances the notion that Kennedy should have 
committed to civil rights upon taking office, not just 
because it was morally right, but because it was 
politically right (Niven XIV). 
 
Niven argues that Kennedy would have taken political advantage from a 
strong commitment to the African American Civil Rights Movement even more 
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than from his ambivalent course of trying to gain Southerners’ approval. The 
realistic political danger for Kennedy thus did not lie in the obstructionist South or 
Congress, but in the constant postponement of comprehensive civil rights action. 
Kennedy could have supported the movement unconditionally because the South 
was in a process of estrangement from the Democratic Party anyway (cf. Niven 
XVI), which had been indicated already years before (cf. Niven 128). Kennedy 
needed the support of groupings like the African American community, as they 
significantly contributed to his electoral success (cf. Niven 38). By analysing 
electoral results and public opinion queries, Niven tries to show that the 
Democratic Party could have tremendously benefited in the future from a strong 
stance on civil rights. Instead, the Kennedys fell victim to ‘a political 
miscalculation’ (Niven XVI), a conclusion which is also cited by Bryant, who 
calls the failure to intervene in the early stages of the Movement ‘a political 
miscalculation of immense scale’ (Bryant 12). Niven furthermore accuses 
President Kennedy not to have personally known any African Americans, an 
argument without sufficient justification, especially when Niven mentions 
Kennedy’s ‘lack of exposure to African Americans as a young person’ (Niven 8). 
It is inappropriate to accuse someone, even a politician, not to be personally 
acquainted with members of a special group. After all, Kennedy did not shy away 
from admitting that he had much to learn about the African American struggle, 
and he did so constantly throughout the course of his administration. Hence the 
claim that Kennedy only had theoretical knowledge of the African American 
cause does not necessarily imply that he was not equipped to handle the issue 
adequately (cf. Niven 8). 
Interestingly, Niven quotes President Kennedy stating ‘There is no sense 
in putting the office of the presidency on the line on an issue, and then being 
defeated’ (Stern 17), a quote obviously referring to the political circumstances at 
the time, especially legal obstructions in Congress, and subsequently interprets it 
merely as an expression of Kennedy’s personal desire to be a winner which, 
according to the author, was a result of the education in the Kennedy family. 
Furthermore, Niven argues that Kennedy, although a ‘master political technician’ 
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(Niven 4), did not have a comprehensive political ideology and was mainly 
guided by the desire to gain the greatest possible approval of both sides. The three 
basic arguments Niven cites to explain Kennedy’s actions are his desire to win, 
his lack of ideology and his deficient knowledge of civil rights issues. His 
explanation therefore primarily focuses to a great extent on aspects of personality, 
disregarding the political circumstances of the time which undoubtedly 
constituted an essential part of an analysis of this historical area. While other 
authors have debated the influence of Kennedy’s personality as well, Niven’s 
pseudo-psychologist arguments convey the impression that Kennedy decided the 
administration’s civil rights course alone and solely on the basis of his personal 
views and opinions, a gravely misleading implication for the reader. Although the 
author does debate the political background at length later in the book, he first 
indulges into the debate on Kennedy’s personality which he apparently blames, at 
least partly, for the cautious political course. The reader therefore absorbs the rest 
of the book against the background of President Kennedy as a cold-hearted 
politician who is obsessed with power and does not have any ideology, let alone 
any knowledge about civil rights. In much the same way as Sorensen is constantly 
showering high praise on Kennedy, Niven proves to be highly manipulative to the 
other extreme.  
As concerns the moral aspect of the African American struggle, Niven 
suggests that a moral compromise as such does not exist because there is only 
right or wrong. This argument has also been stated by Henry Fairlie who believes 
that this specific situation required that the President to take a stand rather than 
manufacture an artificial solution designed to suit both sides (Fairlie 255). 
Referring to Anthony Down’s book An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), 
Niven claims that both sides will necessarily be disappointed with the results and 
will probably, as it is a passionate discussion, persist in their viewpoints even 
more. Niven concludes that this had been an instance where the President had 
better taken a firm stand: ‘Compromise is not always politically preferable’ 
(Niven 199).  
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Etzioni finds that the reluctance to alienate certain societal units ‘is the key 
problem in the societal application of power’ (Etzioni, Active 353). In the higher 
political spheres, exchange prevails as a tool for navigating around obstacles in 
the desired course of action because ‘market relations prevail’ (Etzioni, Active 
357). Judging by Niven’s strongly manipulative and partly aggressive tone, he 
makes the mistake – as do many of Kennedy’s critics – of sometimes losing 
himself in an emotional discussion of the subject, not making an effort to 
consistently analyse the political implications of Kennedy’s decisions as a whole, 
despite the author’s efforts to portray the situation in Congress and Kennedy’s 
dealings with fellow party members below the Mason-Dixie line. His moral 
undertone becomes clear when he says that ‘there was no way to escape the reality 
that the South was wrong’ (Niven 8), though it is hardly point in this discussion 
whether racism is right or wrong. A striking characteristic about Niven’s style is 
that he tends to strongly emphasize his point by making use of typical rhetorical 
figures such as repetition and anaphora (cf. Niven XIV). His eloquence is 
undoubtedly remarkable, yet in the same way as Sorensen the author exaggerates 
and obscures historical facts by deliberately implying speculative conclusions. 
This controversial attitude, although accurate in the rendering of facts, strains the 
neutrality of the concept of ‘the truth’ as such.  
 
 
 
9.2 Mark Stern’s Calculating Visions (1992) 
 
Political scientist Mark Stern has written a book on both John F. 
Kennedy’s and Lyndon B. Johnson’s civil rights achievements. While he only 
subtly includes his personal judgement in the text, his opinion about the nature of 
the relationship between the Movement and the administration is explicitly stated 
in the prologue. That Stern stands in the tradition of the more critical authors is 
evidenced most clearly in the chapter headings, titled ‘An intimidated President’, 
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‘A reluctant Participant’ and ‘A reluctant Commitment’. Johnson, by contrast, is 
identified as the ‘coincident Hero of the Second Black Reconstruction’. The title 
of Stern’s book precisely sums up his main argument that Kennedy’s approach 
represented a pragmatic and diplomatic way of reaching a decision, dominated by 
an urge to control the ways of political power. The author’s style significantly 
differs from that of other critical writers discussed in this thesis, as he uses direct 
quotes almost excessively to form a picture in the reader’s mind while compared 
with Bryant or Niven, he himself rarely comments explicitly on the events.  
Stern represents the Kennedy brothers as political strategists not equipped 
to deal with the civil rights crisis. In the prologue, he makes a distinction between 
‘idealists’ and ‘political schemers’, contrasting the passionate nature of Civil 
Rights Leaders with what he considers the strategic weighing of choices which 
serves the calculation of the best political outcome. Stern decidedly states that the 
schemer is solely dedicated to the accumulation of power, which is the driving 
force behind his efforts. While the representation of idealists and schemers is 
extremely one-sided and one might even say too simple for an accurate historical 
account, it serves to illustrate one of the most crucial interrelations between 
Movement Leaders and the Kennedys. One of the main problems in the struggle 
for civil rights were the fundamentally differing concepts of the Movement on the 
one and the government on the other hand. Stern describes the essence of their 
relationship in the following paragraph:   
 
The former perceives the latter as often weak 
compromisers or temporizers at best and at worst 
sellouts or betrayers of the cause in a world that needs 
truth and justice. The latter perceives the former as 
often unrealistic and unreasonable, if not irrational, in a 
world that moves by bargains and compromises (Stern 
II). 
  
Interestingly, Stern does not see a development or education on part of the 
Kennedys, and while he creates the black and white picture of the moral crusaders 
versus the impassionate politician, he also does not differentiate between the 
Kennedy brothers’ dedication to civil rights. Commonly, even the critical writers 
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speak of a development towards more commitment to civil rights by 1963, yet 
Stern observes that even after the President had decided to take legislative action 
in 1963, he still refused to take the lead in this cause (Stern 79). The author does 
not even raise the question of personal commitment and deeper understanding and 
instead moves within his self-constituted categories of schemers and idealists.  
His main point of criticism is the administration’s strict avoidance of 
alienating Southerners which they feared would lead to considerable political 
disadvantage. He claims that President Kennedy’s behaviour was constantly 
ambivalent (cf. Stern 44), citing many instances of political deals and negotiations 
to illustrate his point. On the issue of racist judges in the South, Stern does not 
only criticise this move but also explicitly states that ‘the administration was 
determined to use court appointments as a bargaining chip with the South’ (Stern 
47), something no other author has worded as strongly. This conclusion, however, 
lacks adequate argumentation because it is well known that the Kennedys invested 
a big part of their civil rights strategy on court proceedings in Southern states and 
would certainly not have been ‘determined’ to ‘wilfully’ obstruct their own plans. 
Stern does not even mention other key figures like African American lawyer 
Thurgood Marshall and Senator James Eastland of Mississippi, who apparently 
had quite a big role in the ‘deal’ (Bryant 288), if there ever was such a thing.  
Stern’s view of Kennedy is that of a politician who only took action if 
forced to do so and who was constantly walking between the lines (cf. Stern 52). 
Even Kennedy’s symbolic gestures which have also found approval among his 
critics are sceptically eyed. Stern argues that in the area of employment, good 
measures were introduced, but they comprised so many exceptions that they did 
not really gain ground on a broad scale (cf. Stern 50). Furthermore, he claims that 
the Kennedys, despite their urge to stabilize their influence, did not have control 
over many critical situations (cf. Stern 58 – 67). On the issue of sending troops 
into the states because of racial equality matters, Stern compares the first such 
case in history, Eisenhower’s Little Rock crisis, with Kennedy’s crisis at the 
University of Mississippi: 
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Both presidents viewed the abrogation of black rights 
as a sidelight to the main issue at hand: federal 
government rights. Neither the presidential position nor 
the southern white position had change since 1957 
(Stern 73). 
 
Stern apparently misconceives the point that the constant emphasis on 
federal rights and duties was part of Kennedy’s strategy. While Kennedy felt that 
there was little sense in starting a debate on principle about the rightfulness of the 
African American Civil Rights Movement, he knew that he had the promising 
chance to embarrass the defiant Governors by appealing to their political 
consciousness and responsibility to uphold the Constitution. Etzioni remarks that 
 
While commitment to a new value can be developed 
and then used to support a line of action, this is a much 
more costly process than appealing to a value that has 
already been internalised (Etzioni, Active 359). 
 
Therefore, attempting to impose moral ideas on Southern politicians was 
much more likely to fail than an appeal in the direction of the states to fulfil their 
legal and political duties, values which had been longstanding traditions of 
democratic societies.  
Even the Department of Justice which is generally perceived as an 
institution of brisk and vigorous purposefulness is blamed for passivity. 
According to Stern, several court proceedings were sometimes ‘delayed at the 
insistence of the AG’ and ‘repeatedly postponed’ (Stern 49). By stating that ‘the 
Attorney General was not adequately prepared for the hearings’ (Stern 102) in 
court, he also makes it seem as if Robert Kennedy had not done his homework.   
Stern claims that ‘Marshall and the administration missed the point’ (Stern 
82) as concerns the civil rights demands of African Americans. As he 
dramatically states, ‘King was not demanding a new law here or a change there. 
He was demanding that the soul of the nation be inflamed’ (Stern 82). By contrast, 
he writes of the lawyers in the Department of Justice as being ‘imbued with the 
idea of dispassionate justice’ (Stern 55) as if this were a hindrance in the 
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administration of the judicial process. This form of reasoning once again 
represents the problem of the passionate and emotional line of argument that the 
civil rights issue entailed.  
The reader receives an impression from Stern’s account which is 
characterised by a black and white conception of what seem to be almost 
adversary forces. The title Calculating Visions captures this paradox which has a 
true core yet is completely exaggerated. Sorensen noted on the office of the 
Presidency that ‘it requires, not calculation, but judgement’ (Sorensen Decision 
10), an accurate observation which draws a distinct line between Stern’s 
conception of the schemer and a political leader who has to consider differing 
forces within the nation’s social fabric.  
 
 
 
9.3 Nick Bryant’s The Bystander (2006) 
 
Journalist Nick Bryant has written a recent and highly critical account of 
Kennedy and civil rights which is pejoratively titled The Bystander. His chapter 
on legislative issues, ‘Executive Inaction’, clearly reveals his point of view. He 
claims that Kennedy could have done more for civil rights already in the early 
years of the administration, had he only seized the chances. By deciding to ‘adopt 
a policy of inaction’ (Bryant 11) due to his fear of negative reactions from the 
South and the Democratic Party, the President failed to calm down the racial 
chaos in its early stages. With regard to the president publicly announcing that he 
would not seek civil rights legislation straight away, Bryant speaks of a 
‘monumental tactical blunder’ (Bryant 206) and argues that Kennedy would at 
least have had the opportunity to bargain for the southern senators’ approval of 
other parts of his legislative program. Instead, his behaviour gave Southern 
democrats the victory they needed to further cling to their political views (cf. 
Bryant 206 – 207). Because Southerners sensed that Kennedy was not entirely 
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opposing them and was not using enough force to contradict them, they were 
encouraged to adhere to their usual policies. According to Bryant, they would not 
have had the courage to openly revolt against the administration if there had been 
a clear commitment and more forceful stand on part of the President (cf. Bryant 
467).  
As regards the fears over a loss of voters on both sides, which was one of 
the most substantial concerns about a strong civil rights stand, Bryant claims that 
such an assumption was ungrounded. While Kennedy lost many voters in the 
South, he won more than twice as much from the African American community 
(cf. Bryant 454), who held him in high esteem until his violent death in 1963 and 
thereafter: at Kennedy’s funeral, a third of the mourners were African Americans 
(cf. Bryant 458). In 1964, a booklet entitled The Kennedy Years and the Negro: A 
Photographic Record (cf. Archival Source #13) was published, a celebration of 
the President’s and the Attorney General’s work in the area of civil rights through 
the tool which the Kennedys had made use of excessively to create their image: 
photography. The Kennedy fascination did not cease, nor did it decline among the 
African American community after the President’s death. Furthermore, Bryant 
dismisses the common notion that a cautious approach was politically necessary 
because of congressional matters: ‘The subsequent justifications put forward on 
Kennedy’s behalf do not stand up in the face of historical evidence’ (Bryant 194). 
According to Bryant, the situation was by no means as obstructionist as it is 
generally portrayed; neither in Congress nor in the Southern states. The author 
cites numerous instances where Kennedy apparently tried to negotiate with 
Southern politicians to make deals to his advantage and points out that most of 
these measures failed. As Kennedy’s legislative program had been blocked by 
Congress in several other areas, these fruitless efforts indicated that the strategy of 
trying to appeal to Southerners politically was bound to fail and not rewarding in 
any way, at any time (cf. Bryant 295).  
By contrast, despite the fact that there had always been criticism from 
Civil Rights Leaders during Kennedy’s term, the majority of the African 
American population approved of his policies, which is documented in several 
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opinion polls. Therefore, Bryant argues, Kennedy was ‘sincerely proud of his 
administration’s progress in the area of civil rights’ (Bryant 291), as his popularity 
did not suffer and he knew how to pull the public relation strings to his advantage. 
Subsequently, there was no urgent reason for the President to introduce legislation 
or undertake other bold action of any kind (cf. Bryant 291 – 294). Kennedy 
proved successful in maintaining this stable position for the first two years of his 
term, and being a skilled orator with the ability to plan strategic moves to bring 
people into his camp, he naturally tried to avoid confrontation (cf. Bryant 467). 
Bryant attributes this success to President Kennedy’s ‘reliance on opinion polls’ 
which ultimately ‘proved to be myopic’ (Bryant 467).  
Interestingly, although he is aware of the token nature of symbolism, 
Bryant gives credit to President Kennedy for appointing African Americans to 
important positions within the government, as well as for including them in White 
House events. By creating a previously denied atmosphere of ‘access and status’ 
(Bryant 293) for African Americans, the President was able to implement a very 
successful strategy of publicity work. A few months after the new administration 
took office, pollster Lou Harris stated that ‘there are strong hints that the public is 
judging the President for his style, manner and approach rather than on the 
specifics he is proposing or acting upon’ (Bryant 223). Yet even for Bryant, the 
efforts of the President were ‘laudable’ (Bryant 219) and although he criticises 
that there had been little personal contact, he essentially is of the same opinion as 
Harris Wofford who claims that such measures were necessary ‘to shock and 
reshape the thought patterns’ (Wofford 138). Many little step-by-step efforts may 
have appeared ‘trivial’ at first, but ‘they marked an unmistakable break with the 
past’ (Bryant 240). The White House meetings with labor leaders, business men 
and representatives of other key areas in public life find Bryant’s approval as 
well: ‘they were not mere exercises in public relations; rather, they were carefully 
considered efforts at long-term social and economic reengineering’ (Bryant 416). 
Furthermore, Bryant credits the President’s for his famous TV address in June 
1963 for the ‘rare passion’ and ‘stark language’ (Bryant 423) he used. The most 
significant aspect about the speech for Bryant is the fact that there was no 
 87
apparent political reason for this sudden move, as it is documented that the 
President very abruptly decided to go on air on this very day, against the 
recommendations of most of his advisors:  
 
Perhaps he felt emboldened by the fact that his 
administration had finally managed a crisis rather than 
merely reacted to it […] Notably, he made the decision 
under no duress – the immediate crisis had been 
averted (Bryant 421). 
 
As concerns personality, Bryant finds that there exist great differences in 
character between the Kennedy brothers. Bryant accuses Kennedy of being a 
‘cynical political operator’ (Bryant 311) guided by ‘political considerations’ 
(Bryant 332) such as gaining the votes of specific target groups by tactical moves. 
Nevertheless, he acknowledges that the President did undergo a process of 
education in the field of civil rights, especially in view of growing crises across 
the nation. The aftermath of the Mississippi crisis for example represented ‘an 
important intellectual step for President Kennedy’ (Bryant 379), as he apparently 
began to reflect his understanding of history and was willing to change his views. 
More importantly, his reaction to the crisis in Birmingham is evidence of 
‘growing attentiveness’ and ‘mounting concern’ (Bryant 385). Throughout his 
political career, Kennedy had always been sympathetic to the cause of racial 
equality, ‘but he constantly made excuses for failing to push for it politically’ 
(Bryant 469). However Bryant perceives a clear development in that Kennedy 
‘had grown in office’ (Bryant 468) and greatly improved his knowledge on the 
issue. He nevertheless claims that despite this constant learning process, the civil 
rights issue in Kennedy’s mind was always embedded in international structures 
and the nation’s reputation abroad (Bryant 472). Bryant also puts the common 
assumption straight that Kennedy tended to ignore civil rights on the whole 
because he did not seek legislation. The author points out that in Kennedy’s 
judgement other measures such as a tax cut were ‘inextricably linked’ (Bryant 
413) to civil rights and would therefore be beneficial to the cause in almost the 
same manner. What Bryant criticises most harshly is Kennedy’s tendency to back 
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off at the slightest sign of controversy which he perceives as an indication of his 
‘strong preference for short-term fixes’ (Bryant 222). While the President did 
clearly grasp the issue and personally was a supporter of equal rights, his focus 
lay on strategically logical moves. This pragmatism made him reluctant in taking 
to heart the advice of more passionate civil rights fighters such as Harris Wofford 
because he had always had the tendency to act ‘in accordance with the politics of 
a particular moment’ (Bryant 226).  
Bryant not only assumes that Robert Kennedy had ‘a fiery core that his 
brother lacked’ (Bryant 244), a view commonly held by many authors, he even 
argues that this understanding for the civil rights issue had been present from a 
very early stage in Kennedy’s life. While Kennedy’s sentence ‘I wouldn’t say I 
stayed awake nights worrying about civil rights before I became Attorney 
General’ is commonly quoted to illustrate his learning process and lack of 
involvement in the early stages, Bryant interestingly is of the opinion that he only 
‘downplayed his early commitment to civil rights’ (Bryant 244). He describes him 
as ‘a man of much firmer conviction and sterner resolve than his brother’ (Bryant 
428) and ultimately someone who was much more emotionally committed to the 
cause of civil rights: ‘Ultimately, RFK outstripped his brother in his dedication to 
the cause of black equality’ (Bryant 470). An interesting characteristic Bryant 
observes about Robert Kennedy’s handling of civil rights is that although the 
Department of Justice had taken brave and courageous action on many fronts such 
as voting rights suits, school desegregation or access to public facilities, the 
Attorney General avoided making equally forceful statements on the issues and 
instead ‘was determined to downplay its significance’ (Bryant 253), adhering to a 
policy of purely judicious explanations with only timid moral implications. This 
he derives from the fact that the Attorney General was an ‘extremely disciplined 
politician’ (Bryant 471) who was very loyal to his brother and therefore stuck to a 
united course of action. This is why, in many cases, Robert Kennedy ‘had 
ultimately done little more than set out – and justify – the administration’s 
minimalist doctrine’ (Bryant 260). Those contradicting forces at work presumably 
 89
lead to what Bryant terms the ‘bewildering ambivalence’ (Bryant 282) in Robert 
Kennedy’s behaviour.  
The difference in character between the Kennedy brothers has 
predominantly been conceived in the way Bryant describes it: the Attorney 
General is portrayed as a passionate and active lawyer who had the Department of 
Justice under his command, while his brother was predominantly cautious and 
indifferent to civil rights. Interestingly, this categorisation which mainly reflects a 
scholarly view has been challenged by another interpretation which demonstrates 
that Movement Leaders perceived Robert Kennedy as ‘arrogant and dismissive’ 
while they had the impression that the President ‘listened attentively’ and 
‘absolutely charmed’ them (Hilty 293). Therefore, it is by no means clear where 
showmanship ended and true commitment began.  
More than once, Kennedy’s advisors requested that he make more forceful 
public statements on civil rights, yet he repeatedly turned them down. Hence 
Bryant claims that ‘he wholly failed to appreciate the incalculable power of 
presidential persuasion, especially in the television age’ (Bryant 410) which 
sounds somewhat ironic considering that John F. Kennedy was the first ‘media’ 
President who made extensive use of the new tools of journalism in other respects. 
When addressing the nation on civil rights, Kennedy took care to focus on 
‘procedural questions: the law, negotiation’ (Bryant 323). Yet even after sending 
legislation to Congress, Kennedy’s behaviour remained ‘manifestly inconsistent’ 
(Bryant 442). Bryant’s opinion on public statements reflects Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
attitude in that he claims that a moral issue had better been addressed because his 
courage to speak out against segregation would have consolidated the President’s 
authority and would have earned him respect in the Southern states (cf. Archival 
Source #14).  
As concerns civil rights legislation, Bryant states that ‘there was strong 
likelihood it would become law before the 1964 election […]’ (Bryant 458) and 
that ‘had Kennedy lived, he would almost certainly have secured passage of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act’ (Bryant 462). Bryant cites Lyndon Johnson’s ‘landslide 
victory’ in the following election as proof that a strong civil rights stand did not 
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mean a loss of votes. This argument, however, is hardly convincing, as Johnson’s 
victory has to been seen in context with Kennedy’s death; Bryant himself notes 
that Johnson was more successful on the civil rights front because he knew how to 
make use of President Kennedy’s tragic death to the advantage of the cause (cf. 
Bryant 463). Thus, it could be argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 were clearly Kennedy’s achievements, with Johnson 
serving as the man who was forced to accept their inheritance: 
 
One hundred years after President Lincoln’s 
Emancipation Proclamation, President Kennedy 
submitted the most comprehensive civil rights 
legislation since 1875 (…) the progress made, even if 
only measured in words and attitudes, cannot fail to 
astound (Glyne 120). 
 
Regardless of whether the promises were in fact implemented or not, his 
rhetorical abilities alone caused considerable enthusiasm among his supporters. 
As no politician before him had dared to publicly promote racial equality in this 
way, it was a new development. On part of the Movement, however, there were 
considerably more concerns about whether legislation of this kind would have 
passed had Kennedy lived. Ralph Abernathy, a civil rights activist and close 
friend of Martin Luther King, wrote in 1989 that ‘It may be unpopular to say so, 
but I don’t believe under President Kennedy we would have gotten either’ 
(Abernathy 322). 
Bryant has to be given credit for pointing out that the critical situations did 
by no means stop with the introduction of civil rights legislation. While other 
authors have made it seem as if Johnson had been the hero who had led the nation 
to a triumphant termination of racial tumults, Bryant notes that ‘in the years after 
Kennedy’s death, there was an explosion of racial violence in the streets of the 
country’s worst black slums’ (Bryant 466). Furthermore, even the praised Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 still found its critics, as was to be expected (Matusow 95). 
Nevertheless, Lyndon B. Johnson’s achievements in this area are commonly 
viewed with greater approval than Kennedy’s (Matusow 180). Kenneth O’Reilly 
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in a discussion about the civil rights endeavours of American Presidents from 
Washington to Clinton claims that the only Presidents who had fundamentally 
stimulated the progress of African Americans were Lincoln and Johnson. The 
subchapter headings are self-explanatory, with Kennedy as the ‘Tough Guy’ 
followed by the ‘Brave Knight’ Johnson. By contrast, Sorensen loyally refers to 
the Civil Rights Act as ‘The Kennedy Civil Rights Bill’ (Sorensen 496).  
Bryant’s paramount argument for his negative judgement of the 
administration’s civil rights course is that Kennedy could have moved faster 
without great turbulence or adjustment on any sides in fields of school integration, 
employment, housing and stronger moral leadership. Significantly, Bryant 
fundamentally differs from the other critical authors in that his conclusion 
contains several specific suggestions on how Kennedy could have improved his 
civil rights programme. He suggests that the housing order could have been issued 
earlier, the CEEO could have acted more active and that even more voting rights 
suits could have been initiated by the Justice Department. One of the greatest 
problems he conceives is the ‘failure to design a thought-out legislative strategy’ 
(Bryant 305). With Kennedy’s support on these levels, Bryant argues, the 
Movement would have stayed more peaceful and would not have looked for ways 
to deliberately provoke violence. Crises such as Birmingham, Ole Miss or the 
Freedom Riders9 could have been avoided. While this would of course not have 
provided an instant solution, it would certainly have had a ‘calming effect’ and 
would have led to ‘sincere collaboration’ between the administration and the 
Movement (Bryant 465). 
He claims that Kennedy by his approach of a strictly judicious line made it 
clear to the South that segregation could go on as long as ‘public order was 
maintained’ (Bryant 276). Thus, influential politicians like Governor George 
Wallace, Governor Ross Barnett and police chief Bull Connor did perceive that 
                                                 
9 Cf. Lowery’s Encyclopedia of African American Civil Rights for details on these key events of 
the Movement. In Birmingham, demonstrators were faced with fierce police violence. Ole Miss 
refers to the troublesome enrolment of the first African American student James Meredith at the 
University of Mississippi. The Freedom Riders attempted to desegregate the public transportation 
system in the South. All of these events attracted worldwide attention, as they involved violence 
and riots to an extent which forced President Kennedy to intervene with military force.  
 92
Kennedy was torn between two sides and sensed that they could oppose him 
openly. James Meredith, the first African American to study at the University of 
Mississippi, made three attempts to enter before Kennedy took more forceful 
action (cf. Bryant 355). This behaviour consequently led to some of the most 
violent racial crises in the United States in the early 60s. Bryant is convinced that 
they could all have been prevented, had the Kennedy brother taken a firmer stand. 
Especially at the first sign of a violation of presidential orders, stricter punishment 
would have been appropriate, as it ‘would have sent an unmistakable signal to 
diehard segregationists’ (Bryant 355). He views the step-by-step negotiations of 
Kennedy in those crises, something which has commonly been approved and 
viewed as an effort to avoid unpleasant clashes with the South as something 
which ultimately constituted a set-back for the administration’s civil rights 
handling (cf. Bryant 356). Bryant claims that national support throughout the 
population would have backed more vigorous action on part of Kennedy and cites 
numerous polls to prove his stance. Another bitter side effect was the mounting 
radical development on part of the movement, a frustrated reaction to constant 
delays and unfulfilled promises (cf. Bryant 283).  
Bryant’s portrayal of the administration’s civil rights handling clearly 
uncovers John F. Kennedy’s weaknesses, yet despite the author opposing the 
President’s approach he depicts Kennedy’s character in a way which includes 
both sides’ standpoints and makes it easy for the reader to retrace the motives for 
his behaviour. Furthermore, while Bryant voices substantial criticism, he also 
makes an effort to suggest alternative courses of action. He concludes that the 
civil rights issue revealed both Kennedy’s strengths as well as his weaker points 
(cf. Bryant 469). While he had been given a ‘unique opportunity’ to indulge into 
forceful civil rights action, he did not accept this position and ultimately 
intervened too late: ‘For far too long, Kennedy had remained a bystander’ (Bryant 
473). 
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10 Historical Writing and Morality 
 
After having discussed the critical books about the Kennedys’ civil rights 
policy, the circle ultimately closes. Pursuing the thoughts on reason and passion 
which have been discussed in chapter three, the role of historical writing and 
morality will be analysed. In the books discussed in previous chapters, an 
astounding range of criticism that is commonly cited throughout historical 
writings concerns moral and often very personal aspects with regard to Kennedy’s 
inner life. Critical writers have regularly accused him of lacking thorough 
historical knowledge on the subject, of not being personally committed and of not 
having socialised with African Americans. Especially the last example which has 
been cited by Niven is completely unfounded in the assessment of Kennedy’s 
achievements.  
In an attempt to disprove this criticism, Maldava E. Glyne has set out to 
reveal President Kennedy’s true intentions and feelings about the Movement by 
analysing his speeches, telephone conversations and statements at press 
conferences in depth, concluding that Kennedy was in fact highly committed to 
civil rights. She quotes various messages, comments on them and in this way tries 
to reveal the meaning behind his words, which is a bold yet questionable 
approach. In fact, mere description bears the risk of getting stuck on the surface of 
events instead of tackling the task of a deeper analysis. Furthermore, one cannot 
help but think that the material Glyne chose as the foundation of her research is 
probably the least representative. Presidential speeches and press conferences are 
commonly bursting with empty phrases and stereotypical expressions which have 
always been an essential part of the political stage. Glyne must surely have been 
aware that especially John F. Kennedy knew how to operate the rhetorical 
machinery to his advantage. While speeches of this kind represent an immensely 
unreliable basis for analysis, the historian would rather do well to rely on evidence 
such as legislation and official hard-fact documents. Again, research in the way 
Glyne has conducted is a matter of interpretation and an attempt to take on the 
impossible task of evaluating Kennedy’s intentions. In the same way as 
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unnecessary assumptions about Kennedy’s personal opinion about the issue, it 
does not contribute anything meaningful to the discussion of facts. Samuel Lubell 
correctly observes that ‘he [Kennedy] acted now because of principles in which he 
believed, now to pursue political advantage, now because events pushed him; 
ordinarily on all of those accounts’ (Lubell 102).  
Historians also criticise that there often were reprehensible party political 
motives behind both President Kennedy’s endeavours and the delays, when he 
should have acted on the basis of a moral foundation. Interestingly, this point is 
often cited even in view of actions which undoubtedly had a positive impact on 
the advancement of African Americans, thus leading to the redundant question 
whether or not those measures came ‘from the heart’. To cite one of those 
arguments, it has often been said that the voter registration efforts of the 
administration, which were supposed to empower African Americans and led to 
desegregation in other areas, were not ‘sincere’ in that the President only wanted 
to prevent further tumultuous riots on the streets. Apart from the fact that such a 
motivation would certainly not be the worst reason to act, Kennedy did in fact 
take care to avert upheavals that would lead to international embarrassment. In 
view of this criticism, Wofford avers that ‘the strategy was not suddenly 
discovered or imposed by the Kennedys’ and that it was a concept that had always 
appealed to many Civil Rights Leaders. In fact, Martin Luther King expressed his 
sympathy for such a course of action and explicitly asked the administration for 
support in the voting rights campaigns of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, as they lacked sufficient funds to organise and educate their followers 
(cf. Archival Source #15). In the same line as Wofford, acknowledging the 
positive aspect of Kennedy’s harshly criticised actions, Harold Fleming remarks 
that   
 
Any dispassionate analysis must credit the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations with an impressive 
performance in the enforcement of federal court orders. 
But the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s is not 
inclined toward dispassionate analysis (Fleming 387). 
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It is presumptuous to speak of a lack of emotional or moral involvement 
on Kennedy’s part; Civil Rights Leaders may do so to advertise their cause, but 
the historian’s task, however informal his account may be, is first and foremost to 
focus on actions and facts and not on personal attitudes. Political psychologist 
James H. Kuklinski remarks on the nature of moral versus pragmatic judgement:  
 
In a democratic society, reasonable decisions are 
preferable to unreasonable ones; considered thought 
leads to the former, emotions to the latter […] citizens 
are to approach the subject of politics with temperate 
consideration and objective analysis, that is, to use 
their heads when making judgements about public 
affairs (Etzioni, Rule 98). 
 
If this applies to the citizens of a nation, it surely must be the task of the 
historian to render an equally objective discussion of political events. He has to 
consider that every politician is the victim of the contemporary social situation 
surrounding him and that he has to act according to the manoeuvring room he has 
been provided with. Indeed, there is ample evidence that Kennedy tried to select 
alternative ways which would provide him with the opportunity to reduce his 
dependence on Congress and other political institutions. When the President met 
with Civil Rights Leaders in the White House, there was a strong willingness on 
both sides to produce a viable outcome. Nevertheless, the negotiations were often 
characterised by massive misunderstandings which derived neither from 
indifference on part of Kennedy nor from reluctance to cooperate on part of the 
Movement. One must credit Kennedy with the fact that he did not flatter the 
Movement and directly confronted civil rights workers with the ‘political realities 
they faced’ (Koenig, “Social Justice” 171). Ralph Abernathy recalls that at one 
meeting the leaders were informed by the President that their proposals ‘just 
didn’t fit into his agenda. He told us so quite frankly’ (Abernathy 236). 
Ultimately, many of those meetings left both sides in a state of confusion and 
frustration about the lines of argument they had to face. It was exactly this basic 
difference in approach which led many authors to categorise workers on the civil 
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rights front as downright moral crusaders, whereas Kennedy is commonly 
perceived as overly cautious, pragmatic and insensitive (cf. Parmet 268). 
While the political correctness of the modern age fools us into thinking 
that there exist the same priorities on some levels for everyone, reality proves to 
be a constant struggle of differing opinions, as goes to show even in the case of 
civil rights. Therefore, the morality of an issue does not necessarily heighten its 
place in the ranking of the issues a nation faces. As the central demand of the 
Civil Rights Movement was social change and in view of the fact that there was as 
violent opposition in Southern states, as evidenced in numerous crises in Alabama 
and Mississippi, it can be assumed that executive action and law enforcement 
were an adequate strategy to evoke social change, for reason apparently was not 
enough to change a custom in the South which had developed for centuries. The 
Civil Rights Movement in its attempt to change the overall social structure by 
itself would probably not have succeeded if Kennedy had been like Eisenhower 
on the civil rights front. Evidently, guidance in the form of legal and political 
stability is an indispensable tool of democratic societies to master such crises. 
Furthermore, what were the White House meetings with business men, lawyers 
and other groups other than a moral approach? The memoranda that President 
Kennedy was given for preparation for those meetings by special counsel Lee C. 
White clearly demonstrate sensitivity for the moral dimension. Apart from a 
section entitled ‘what can these people do’, offering suggestions for the 
participants’ own initiatives for helping to advance equal rights, the issues 
discussed in these meetings constituted realistic proposals for implementing 
change (cf. Archival Source #16). 
As concerns the reproach that the President did fail to speak out for civil 
rights more forcefully, John F. Kennedy’s civil rights actions as a whole clearly 
indicate that the lack of public statements and ‘verbal enforcement’ were part of a 
deliberate decision not to risk even more racial wars in the Southern states than 
there already were. Brauer gives credit to the President in view of the fact that ‘to 
the end, he neither abandoned nor excoriated the white South’ (Brauer 317).While 
critics claim that this approach was wrong in the case of a moral issue, it has to be 
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noted, as Brauer correctly implies, that in neither situation would it be advisable 
to shut out one side of a conflict, however one may personally think about it. As 
demonstrations had already led to violent deaths and injuries, one can hardly be 
resentful of an attempt to calm down those riots while at the same time conducting 
largely unpublicised conversations which would bring about social change in a 
more moderate manner. Moreover, as the President of the United States, he would 
have had to take the blame for eventual failure if a public statement had 
eventually backfired.  
The moral line of argument, while it mostly represents the historians’ 
personal assumptions, is immensely misleading for the reader if he takes the 
written evidence as a fact. In studying the wealth of secondary literature on the 
subject, the above mentioned diverging opinions surface in ludicrous extremes, 
with only few authors such as Wofford resisting the temptation to present a fairly 
one-sided point of view. Depending on which accounts are being read, the reader 
will conclude whatever is imposed on him by the author’s selection of facts and 
accordingly form an image of the President either as an active moral leader of the 
nation or as a cautious and passive political schemer. It seems immensely 
inappropriate to accuse Kennedy of a lack of personal commitment; he apparently 
chose not to include a public display of emotional involvement it in his strategy. 
Apart from the questionable validity of such claims, they have produced 
confusing distortions in this field of study, failing to contribute to the production 
of historical evidence. Pierre Bourdieu remarks on the analysis of political action: 
 
[…] political reform strategies and their analyses 
always have to consider both levels of affect: for one 
thing, the internal power structure of the political field, 
for another thing, the over-all status hierarchy 
embedded in society (my transl., Bourdieu qtd. in 
Bonacker 352 – 353). 
 
With this statement, Bourdieu provides an explanation as to why 
representation is contradictory, namely the often limited perspectives that authors 
use to support their contention. Civil rights defenders tend to speak of the conflict 
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as a moral issue, as did President Kennedy in his speeches out of the need for 
verbal conciliation. White House staff members, on the contrary, have argued on 
the basis of the political field and its power structure, pointing out legislative 
limitations such as the unwillingness of Congress or problems in federal 
protection. Considering the status hierarchy of society, it is a fact that democratic 
societies rely on the established rules of law and order and that the citizens of a 
nation tend to approve of this system and its policies. It certainly sounds 
philosophical to assume that ‘law is fetter, right is freedom; and they differ like 
contraries’ (Cairns 254). Yet in an age where political institutions are a dominant 
feature of social life, such reflections appear purely theoretical and bear little 
relation to the actual situation. It is indisputable that in modern societies, there 
exists a social contract upon which people have agreed; a contract which provides 
for an authority that will regulate social life.  
A crucial problem of the moral line of argument is the assumption that 
people will chose the ‘right’ path automatically and independently from 
governmental and political institutions. Burke Marshall has repeatedly pointed to 
the danger of potential abuse which could result from modifications of existing 
laws. While the participation of societal sub-units can assist those in power to 
effect change, it may also lead to an overload of the political system which would 
inevitably lead to a redefinition of the power structure and hence to an impairment 
of ‘notions which have worked, and worked well, in other contexts’ (Marshall 
50).  
In historical writing, the moral dimension of any dispute or war mostly 
contains a deeper meaning we seek to make sense of. Historical events teach us a 
lesson and deserve in-depth analysis, yet the task of the historian is first and 
foremost to render the facts in an exhaustive and objective manner in order to 
leave an interpretation of the incident to the reader. Indeed, for many authors, 
‘history is the open bible […] our function is to teach people to read it and to 
reflect upon it for themselves.’ (Walsh 108). The books which have been 
discussed in this thesis clearly reveal the weakness of moral judgement in 
historical writing, as it has the effect of a distorting mirror, subsequently 
 99
conveying obscured representations. Maldava E. Glyne is one of the few critics 
who has correctly observed that especially in the area of civil rights ‘there is a 
need for a dispassionate study’ (Glyne 24).  
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11 Conclusion 
 
Former Kennedy counselor Theodore C. Sorensen once remarked about the 
President’s understanding of the reconstruction era that he arrived at the conclusion 
that ‘history depends on who writes it’ (Sorensen 204). It is precisely this 
realisation which characterises the discourse on the administration’s civil rights 
achievements as well. The aim of this thesis was to uncover the differing 
representations of this episode of American history.  
The nine books chosen for analysis have served as puzzle pieces in 
establishing clarity about the nature of the whole picture. As most of the literature 
on which this thesis builds is not available in Austria, a research trip to the 
renowned John F. Kennedy Library in Boston, Massachusetts, proved to be of 
utmost significance for the realisation of the project. The comprehensive archives 
of the library harbour excellent primary sources such as memoranda, letters and 
official documents which greatly assisted in the development of arguments. While 
the critical discussion of secondary literature is certainly the cornerstone of this 
project, the access to primary documents created a deeper understanding of the 
issue. In addition, the Mugar Library, a branch of the Boston University Libraries, 
provided rare texts on historical background and a broad range of sociological 
books. This research trip proved to be highly relevant, yet it also confirmed the 
expectation that while large amounts of literature on either the Kennedys or the 
Civil Rights Movement were available, literature devoted exclusively to both 
aspects was indeed scarce, especially if compared to the wealth of material 
available on foreign policy issues during Kennedy’s term.  
In analysing the discourse on the Kennedy brothers and civil rights, several 
tendencies can be observed. Harry Golden and Carl M. Brauer have produced 
thorough pro-Kennedy accounts. Within the category of former associates of the 
administration, Theodore C. Sorensen and Arthur M. Schlesinger have contributed 
to, or indeed triggered the writings on the Kennedy myth in order to create a 
thoroughly positive image of the President. Both praise Kennedy for his readiness 
to engage in dialogue both with civil rights activists and with the public through 
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skilful use of the media. Sorensen’s most extensive use of dramatic language bears 
witness to his abilities as a speech writer who is well capable of creating 
mythological elements in his narrative. Other authors who were more specifically 
involved in the area of civil rights through their profession chose a more distinct 
focus. Harris Wofford as a staunch civil rights advocate and at the same time a 
loyal Kennedy advisor created a rather balanced account and a critical reflection of 
what he experienced first-hand during his days in the White House. By contrast, 
Burke Marshall attempted to represent the Justice Department’s position. Both 
authors decidedly attempt to raise awareness for the grey areas of the conflict, not 
only in the legal sphere but also in the ‘right’ way to proceed and to act. Wofford, 
along with Bryant, makes an effort to represent all the arguments of both sides in 
their totality, thus creating a more nuanced account. Finally, critical authors 
predominantly construct their narrative around inflexible categories. David Niven 
argues that a moral compromise does not exist and clings to the notion of clear 
boundaries between right and wrong. In the same way, Stern delivers a black-and-
white portrayal in drawing the line between idealists and schemers. Their historical 
accounts reflect the very essence of a characteristic of fictional writing in that they 
create a world without nuances which provides the reader with a predefined 
categorisation of good and bad. Evidently, historical writing does bear certain 
similarities to fiction. Ultimately, those classifications culminate in the division 
between moral and pragmatic argumentation which has been analysed in detail.  
An interesting aspect in the discourse about Kennedy and civil rights is that 
a legal and factual approach such as Marshall’s can rarely be found, whereas the 
moral aspect and the fundamental rightfulness of the Movement are dominating 
elements in the reconstruction of past events. Another essential aspect in historical 
writing about the Kennedy brothers is the distinction between politics and 
personality. The cultivation of their image made the Kennedys more famous for the 
gossip than for policy making, whereby it is almost impossible to separate the two 
aspects. The Kennedy family has become a brand and a figure of popular culture, 
which is reflected in many so-called ‘historical’ books that focus on the myth 
rather than political achievements. When approaching the past through texts, it is 
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therefore significant to keep in mind the influence of reputation, morality and a 
depiction of what we think of as reality. American journalist Harry S. Ashmore 
remarks on Kennedy’s commitment to civil rights: ‘I think Jack Kennedy has been 
unfairly criticised in that regard by many of the revisionists […] Hindsight doesn’t 
alter the reality he faced’ (Ashmore 370). Reality is obscured by the author’s 
priorities and his selection of source material; consequently, what he produces in 
writing is characterised not only by his style and wording but also by what these 
elements reflect about the author’s inevitable interpretation of an objective truth 
which is unknown. In this way, the reader who is not aware of such nuances is 
forced to accept rather one-sided viewpoints. In order to make sense of the past, 
historical narratives must be read carefully and need to be balanced against other 
accounts. This approach of close reading will not only encourage a discussion on 
relevant questions of classification and assessment which characterise the insight 
into present procedures, it also confirms the incontrovertible truth that ‘we all see 
different pasts’ (Wallerstein 1).  
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13 Appendix: Chronology of events 1960 – 1963 
Information taken from www.jfklibrary.org  
 
Jan 2, 1960   JFK announces his candidacy for President 
May 6, 1960   President Eisenhower signs Civil Rights Act of 1960 
Oct 19, 1960 Martin Luther King arrested in Atlanta during 
demonstrations, JFK calls Coretta King 
Nov 8, 1960   JFK elected 35th President of the United States 
Dec 5, 1960 Supreme Court bans discrimination in interstate bus 
terminals 
May 14, 1961 Freedom Riders attacked and bus burned in Anniston, 
Alabama 
May 29, 1961 RFK succeeds in desegregating interstate travel  
Jun 1961 Justice Department’s Voter Education Project starts 
Nov 29 – Dec 2, 1961  Freedom Riders attacked in McComb, Mississippi 
Jan 25, 1962 Voting rights legislation is introduced in Congress 
May 15, 1962 Administration’s first civil rights bill defeated in Senate 
Aug 28, 1962 Justice Department files voting rights suits 
Sep 30 – Oct 1, 1962 JFK sends federal troops to support James Meredith’s 
effort to be admitted as the first African American 
student at the University of Mississippi 
Nov 20, 1962 JFK bars discrimination in federally financed housing 
Feb 28, 1963 JFK sends his first special message on civil rights to 
Congress 
May 3, 1963 Birmingham police chief Bull Connor uses police dogs 
and fire hoses to break up civil rights demonstrations 
Jun 11, 1963 Governor George Wallace attempts to block the 
schoolhouse door to prevent two African American 
students from enrolment at the University of Alabama. 
JFK delivers his most famous civil rights speech.  
Jun 19, 1963  JFK sends his proposed Civil Rights Act to Congress 
Aug 28, 1963   March on Washington takes place 
Jul 2, 1964   President Johnson signs Civil Rights Act of 1964 
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15 Abstract 
 
Diese Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Erörterung des Diskurses über 
John und Robert F. Kennedy und die Bürgerrechtsbewegung im Zeitraum von 
1960 bis 1963. Die widersprüchlichen Darstellungen dieses Kapitels in der 
Geschichte der Vereinigten Staaten werden ausführlich analysiert, wobei das 
Image der Kennedys als amerikanische Helden von den gewählten Autoren 
entweder unterstützt oder verworfen wird. Aus diesem Diskurs eröffnen sich dem 
Leser grundsätzlich unterschiedliche und oft verzerrte Perspektiven der 
Geschichte, die im Detail untersucht werden. Als kulturwissenschaftlicher 
Rahmen der Arbeit fungiert ein „close reading“ einer Reihe repräsentativer Texte, 
was in Folge zu einer Analyse der Dimensionen von moralischer und 
pragmatisch-logischer Argumentation in diesen historischen Berichten führt. 
Weiters spielen vor allem sozialer Wandel, der Ansatz des „incrementalism“ 
sowie Konzepte von Macht und Kommunikation eine Schlüsselrolle im Zugang 
zu den ausgewählten Primärtexten. Hierbei sind vor allem die Ansätze des 
Soziologen Amitai Etzioni vorrangig, dessen Konzepte zu genannten Begriffen 
eine detaillierte Besprechung der Literatur ermöglichen.   
Im Laufe der Arbeit werden vier spezifische Gruppierungen von Autoren 
diskutiert, die ein breites Spektrum an Ansichten von großem Lob bis hin zu 
scharfer Kritik verkörpern. Harry Golden (Mr Kennedy and the Negroes, 1964) 
und Carl M. Brauer (John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction, 1977) 
vertreten einen eindeutig positiven Standpunkt. In der Kategorie von 
entschiedenen Verfechtern der Bürgerrechtspolitik der Kennedys ranken sich die 
Bücher der ehemaligen Berater Theodore C. Sorensen (Kennedy, 1964) und 
Arthur M. Schlesinger (A Thousand Days, 1965) um den Kennedy-Mythos. Zwei 
andere Mitarbeiter der Kennedy Brüder wiederum wählen einen grundsätzlich 
anderen Zugang. Harris Woffords Of Kennedys and Kings (1980) liefert einen 
ausgewogenen Bericht seiner Zeit als Berater im Weißen Haus ohne ein 
eindeutiges Urteil zu fällen. Burke Marshall, der am Justizministerium tätig war, 
beschreibt seine Ansichten von einem vorrangig juristischen Blickpunkt in seinem 
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Buch Federalism and Civil Rights (1964), in dem er die Möglichkeiten und 
Einschränkungen des Handlungsspielraumes des Präsidenten und des 
Generalstaatsanwaltes in Krisensituationen erörtert. Die letzte Kategorie von 
Büchern widmet sich einer dezidiert kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit dem 
Thema. David Nivens The Politics of Injustice (2003) ist aufgrund der 
verwendeten Sprache und der Argumentationsweise sicherlich die negativste 
Darstellung. Mark Stern schafft in Calculating Visions (1992) eine deutliche 
Kategorisierung von den Kennedys versus der Bügerrechtsbewegung als einander 
entgegen gesetzte Kontrastpunkte. In dem aktuellsten Buch The Bystander (2006) 
spekuliert Nick Bryant offen über die Hintergründe der Ereignisse und fällt 
letztlich ein skeptisches Urteil.  
 Die kulturwissenschaftliche Analyse der Meinungsvielfalt in den 
genannten Texten wirft Fragen über die Natur von historischen Schilderungen auf 
und führt zu einer Debatte über Moral und Logik als schriftstellerische Zugänge, 
wobei neben der Erörterung des soziokulturellen Hintergrunds eine American 
Studies Perspektive angewendet wird, welche den widersprüchlichen Diskurs über 
die Bürgerrechtspolitik der Kennedys zu entwirren und zu erklären versucht.  
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